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California law prohibit such individualisation based 
on protected characteristics, in this way further re-
stricting the remaining leeway. While privacy laws in 
the U.S. and California set some significant but rather 
specific limits for the individualisation of insurance 
contracts based on the use of personal data, the all-
encompassing Swiss (and European) data protection 
law is clearly the most important barrier to individu-
alisation in Switzerland. Namely, it remains unclear 
whether the processing of personal data for the pur-
pose of individualising insurance contracts may be 
based on the legitimate interests of the insurer. As a 
consequence, insurance companies are advised to al-
ways obtain their customers’ consent for making in-
dividual offers based on big data analytics. The au-
thors conclude that instead of indirectly hindering 
the individualisation of insurance contracts through 
data protection law, Swiss (and European) lawmakers 
should initiate a dialogue involving all stakeholders 
to determine which sectors of insurance should be 
dominated by the principle of solidarity and in which 
sectors and on what informational basis the individ-
ualisation of insurance contracts should be allowed.
Abstract:  With the advent of big data analytics, 
the individualisation of mass market insurance poli-
cies has become commercially attractive. While this 
development would have positive economic effects, it 
could also undermine the principle of solidarity in in-
surance. This paper aims to outline the different reg-
ulatory approaches currently in place for dealing with 
this fundamental challenge by analysing the insur-
ance, anti-discrimination and data protection laws 
of Switzerland and the U.S./California pertaining to 
health, renters and automobile insurance. It will be 
shown that the leeway for individualising insurance 
contracts is vanishingly small for (mandatory) health 
insurance on both sides of the Atlantic. By contrast, 
the two legal systems pursue different regulatory 
approaches with regard to the other two types of in-
surance. Renters and automobile insurance are pre-
dominantly governed by the freedom of contract 
principle in Switzerland, whereas in California sec-
tor specific regulations significantly limit the infor-
mational basis of insurance companies, thereby lim-
iting the leeway for individualisation to a large extent. 
While Swiss anti-discrimination law hardly restricts 
the individualisation of insurance contracts, U.S. and 
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A. Introduction
1 The individualisation of insurance contracts is not 
an entirely new phenomenon, but it has long been 
quite costly and, therefore, not very widespread. 
By definition, insurance is a data-rich industry; the 
insurance undertakings always had to base their 
business on accurate and relevant data for risk-
based calculations.1 The growing amount of data 
(big data), the increasing computing power and 
novel technologies (big data analytics), however, 
allow today’s insurance companies to individualise 
insurance contracts in all sectors of the industry.
2 In most insurance markets, companies have long 
operated with categories of insured for which 
they calculated the risks and the corresponding 
premiums. But due to big data analytics, it has 
recently become commercially viable to create 
risk profiles for individual customers and make 
them corresponding individual offers.2 At least 
from today’s perspective, this applies above all to 
insurance premiums. Individualisation of other 
contractual conditions is unlikely to be commercially 
attractive in the near future.
3 The individualisation of insurance premiums raises 
fundamental legal questions. Given that one of the 
basic concepts of insurance has always been (and 
* Professor of Information and Communications Law, Chair 
of the Executive Board of the Center for Information 
Technology, Society, and Law (ITSL), and Director of 
the Digital Society Initiative (DSI) University of Zurich, 
Switzerland.
† Ph.D. cand., University of Zurich, Switzerland.
‡ Ph.D. cand., University of Zurich, Switzerland.
§ Professor of Law emeritus, Member of the Executive Board 
of the Center for Information Technology, Society, and Law 
(ITSL), University of Zurich, Switzerland.
1 Rolf H. Weber, ‘Big Data in the Insurance Industry’ (2016) 
Jusletter dated 12 December 2016, para 3.
2 Cf. IBM Corporation, Harnessing the power of data 
and analytics for insurance (White Paper, 2015) 2; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Der Insurance Monitor: 
Operational Excellence - Analytics als Grundlage für ein 
digitales Geschäftsmodell, June 2016, <https://news.pwc.
ch/de/28303/studie-der-insurance-monitor-operational-
excellence-analytics-als-grundlage-fur-ein-digitales-
geschaftsmodell/> accessed 25 September 2018, at 18 ff.; 
BearingPoint Institute, ‘The smart insurer: more than 
just big data‘, <www.bearingpoint.com/files/BEI004-17-
The-smart-insurer.pdf&download=0&itemId=389133>, 
accessed 25 September 2018, 58; Philip Bitter and Steffen 
Uphues, ‘Big Data für die Versichertengemeinschaft’, in: 
Thomas Hoeren (ed) Phänomene des Big-Data-Zeitalters: 
Eine rechtliche Bewertung im wirtschaftlichen und 
gesellschaftlichen Kontext, (Westfälische Wilhelms 
Universität Münster 2019) 147, 153 f.; Weber (n 1) para 8ff. 
For times when such individualisation was not yet possible 
cf: Willy Koenig, Schweizerisches Privatversicherungsrecht: 
System des Versicherungsvertrags und der einzelnen 
Versicherungsarten (Herbert Lang & Cie 1967) 172.
continues to be) the solidarity of the insured,3 
the law will need to strike an appropriate balance 
between the opposing concepts of solidarity and 
individualisation. Different legal systems will come 
up with different solutions and these solutions will 
likely not be the same for all types of insurances. 
This paper aims to outline possible solutions to 
this fundamental challenge by analysing the legal 
situation on both sides of the Atlantic using the 
jurisdictions of Switzerland (incl. partly the EU) 
and California as examples of two quite different 
approaches.
4 For both systems, three bodies of law need to 
be analysed: First, we will clarify if and to what 
extent the applicable insurance regulations allow 
for an individualisation of insurance contracts 
(C). Second, we will assess whether and under 
what conditions the individualisation of insurance 
contracts is compatible with the requirements 
of anti-discrimination law (D). Third, we will 
investigate whether the processing of personal 
data, which is carried out to calculate individual 
premiums, complies with the requirements of data 
protection law (E). In order to gain a broad picture 
of the phenomenon, we will analyse three types of 
insurances: (mandatory) health insurance, renters 
insurance and automobile insurance. At first, 
however, we will briefly outline the rationale behind 
the individualisation of insurance contracts (B).
B. Individualisation of 
Insurance Contracts
5 Insurance contracts – and in particular insurance 
premiums – can essentially be individualised with 
regard to two aspects: the risk profile, defined by 
factors such as age, gender, health, work activity, 
place of residence, driving behaviour, etc., and the 
willingness to pay.4 These two aspects can easily 
be combined in the individualisation of an offer. 
Nevertheless, the rationale for individualisation 
in terms of the willingness to pay differs from the 
rationale for individualisation with regard to the 
risk profile. Each aspect will therefore be discussed 
separately.
3 E.g. Weber (n 1) para 16. 
4 Moreover, prices might be individualised based on the 
likelihood that a policyholder will change carriers, see: Rick 
Swedloff, ‘Regulating Algorithmic Insurance’ (2019) <http://
dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3346753>, accessed 8 April 2019, 4.
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I. Risk Profile
6 Insurance premiums are generally calculated 
based on the risk profile of the insured. Most often, 
however, insurance companies do not calculate 
the risk for each customer but form groups of 
customers and offer premiums corresponding to 
the risk assessment of that group. This serves two 
important policy goals; namely, the reduction of 
adverse selection and the avoidance of moral hazard. 
7 The notion of adverse selection5 refers to the 
phenomenon that more attractive suppliers or buyers 
are driven out of the market due to information 
asymmetries. If insurance companies were to insure 
a certain risk for all potential policyholders at a 
uniform price, taking out such insurance would be 
particularly attractive for persons whose individual 
risk is above the average risk on the basis of which 
the uniform premium was calculated. The offer 
would therefore attract comparatively unattractive 
customers. If only these customers were to take 
out the insurance offered, the insurance company 
would either have to accept losses because the 
risks associated to its customers are higher than 
anticipated, or it would have to increase the 
premiums in order to reflect the higher risks of its 
actual customers. Over time, this mechanism would, 
theoretically, increase the premiums to a point 
where it would no longer be worthwhile for anyone 
to take out insurance. In reality, however, this effect 
is unlikely to be observed because policyholders 
are unable to assess their risks accurately; rather, 
they are prepared to take out insurance against a 
risk that cannot be precisely calculated. Even if the 
mechanism described is hardly observed in practice, 
a uniform premium for all policyholders would still 
attract comparatively unattractive customers and 
may thus lead to a race to the bottom. The formation 
of risk groups can prevent this effect by offering 
insurance to members of different risk groups at 
different prices. This is all the more true if the offers 
are individualised according to the risk profile of the 
individual policyholders.
8 Moral hazard6 occurs when people behave 
irresponsibly or recklessly due to false incentives.7 
The standard example of moral hazard is a change in 
5 On adverse selection see also: Ronen Avraham and others, 
‘Understanding Insurance Antidiscrimination Laws’ (2014) 
87 S.Cal.L.Rev 195, 204ff. with further references; Bitter and 
Uphues (n 2) 155.
6 On moral hazard see also: Avraham and others (n 5) 206ff. 
with further references; Bitter and Uphues (n 2) 156.
7 Cf. N. Gregory Mankiw and Mark P. Taylor, Grundzüge der 
Volkswirtschaftslehre (7th edn, Schaeffer-Poeschel 2018) 
363; for a more restrictive definition see Peter Zweifel and 
Roland Eisen, Versicherungsökonomie (2nd edn, Springer 2003) 
295f., according to which moral hazard exists when persons 
adapt their behaviour due to the existence of a contract.
behaviour following the conclusion of an insurance 
contract for a particular risk.8 The risk of such 
behavioural changes can be reduced if premiums 
are increased after a claim and thus incentives are 
created for policyholders to prevent the occurrence 
of a claim despite the existence of an insurance 
contract. The individualisation of insurance 
contracts – and in particular of insurance premiums 
– opens up further possibilities for combating moral 
hazard. In particular, insurers can create incentives 
for risk-reducing behaviour by collecting data about 
the behaviour of their policyholders, for example, by 
granting discounts if an insured person demonstrably 
is a cautious driver or exercises regularly.9 These 
effects are positive, not only for policyholders and 
insurers, but also for society as a whole, since they 
prevent the occurrence of damage and promote the 
health of policyholders.10
9 In addition to fighting adverse selection and moral 
hazard, adjusting insurance premiums to the risks 
of individual customers or groups of customers 
promotes fairness by avoiding or at least limiting 
situations in which individuals have to pay for the 
risks created and the damages caused by others. It 
seems, however, that this only holds true for risks 
that can be controlled by the individual customers, 
e.g. by adjusting their driving behaviour. With 
regard to factors beyond the control of individuals 
– such as their genetic disposition – it would seem 
rather unfair if individual customers were treated 
differently.11 As we will see, this distinction is already 
mirrored in the law to a large extent as the leeway to 
individualise insurance premiums is very limited for 
health care,12 while it is predominantly permitted for 
other types of insurance such as renters insurance13 
and automobile insurance.14
8 Zweifel and Eisen (n 7) 295; see also Felix Walter Lanz, Adverse 
Selection und Moral Hazard in der Privat- und Sozialversicherung, 
Luzerner Beiträger zur Rechtwissenschaft, vol 77 
(Schulthess 2014) 39; Martin Nell, Versicherungsinduzierte 
Verhaltensänderungen von Versicherungsnehmern (VVW GmbH 
1993) 4.
9 So called “Pay How You Drive”-Model, cf. Allstate 
Corp. ‘How Telematics May Affect Your Car Insurance’, 
December 2018 <www.allstate.com/tr/car-insurance/
telematics-device.aspx> accessed 4 June 2019; Rick Swedloff, 
‘Risk Classification’s Big Data Revolution’ (2014) 21 Conn. 
Insurance L.J. 339, 342 ff; Peter Maas and Veselina Milanova, 
‘Zwischen Verheissung und Bedrohung – Big Data in der 
Versicherungswirtschaft’ (2014) 87 Die Volkswirtschaft, 
23, 24.
10 In more detail: Maas and Milanova (n 9), 24ff.
11 Cf. Swedloff (n 4) 8ff. For a discussion on the fairness of 
(individualised) risk classification: Avraham and others 
(n 5) 203ff. and 214ff. 
12 See below, for Switzerland: C.II.1; for California: C.III.1.
13 See below, for Switzerland: C.II.2 ; for California: C.III.2.b).
14 See below, for Switzerland: C.II.2; for California: C.III.2.c).
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II. Willingness to Pay
10 Individualisation according to the willingness to 
pay is based on the fact that policyholders with 
a uniform risk profile may have a different need 
for insurance coverage and different financial 
resources for concluding an insurance contract. 
Insurance companies can take this into account 
when determining premiums by offering higher 
premiums to customers with a higher willingness 
to pay and cheaper offers to the others. When doing 
so, however, insurance companies will have to bear 
in mind that many people find the individualisation 
of prices according to the willingness to pay unfair.15 
This fact significantly limits the ability to price 
customers according to their willingness to pay, also 
in the insurance industry. From a purely economic 
point of view, however, aligning prices with the 
willingness to pay has positive effects, both for the 
insurance companies and their customers.
11 In economics, the individualisation of prices to 
absorb maximum willingness to pay is referred to 
as first-degree price discrimination or perfect price 
discrimination.16 In insurance, this type of price 
discrimination has two main effects: On the one 
hand, all insurance policyholders can skim off their 
full willingness to pay, which allows the insurer 
to increase his turnover and maximise profit. On 
the other hand, the insurance can also be sold to 
customers whose willingness to pay is below the 
uniform price that would be chosen by the insurer 
if he could not or did not wish to discriminate 
15 Empirical studies have shown, in particular, that price 
discrimination will often be regarded as unfair if it exceeds 
a certain level, is clearly disadvantageous compared to a 
reference price, or if other consumers pay significantly 
less; cf. Martin Fasnacht and Jochen Mahadevan, 
‘Grundlagen der Preisfairness – Bestandesaufnahme und 
Ansätze für zukünftige Forschung’ (2010) 60 Journal für 
Betriebswirtschaft, 295, 302ff., with further references; 
Werner Reinartz and others, Preisdifferenzierung und 
-dispersion im Handel, (White Paper, 2017) <www.marketing.
uni-koeln.de/sites/marketingarea/user_upload/171130_
Whitepaper_Preisdifferenzierung_und_-dispersion_
im_Handel.pdf> accessed 25 September 2018, 11; Florian 
Engelmaier and others, Price Discrimination and Fairness 
Concerns, Munich Discussion Paper No. 2012-7 (Ludwig-
Maximillians-Universiät München 2012) <https://epub.
ub.uni-muenchen.de/12735/1/Englmaier_Gratz_Reisinger-
Price_Discrimination_and_Fairness_Concerns.pdf> 
accessed 3 June 2019; Simon Lee and Abdou Illia, ‘Perceived 
price fairness of dynamic pricing’ (2011) 111 Industrial 
Management & Data Systems 2011, 531; Kelly L. Haws and 
William O. Bearden, ‘Dynamic Pricing and Consumer Fairness 
Perceptions’ (2006) 33 Journal of Consumer Research 2006, 
304; Matthew A. Edwards, ‘Price and Prejudice: The Case 
against Consumer Equality in the Information Age’ (2006) 
10 Lewis & Clark L.Rev., 559. 
16 Lars A. Stole, ‘Price Discrimination and Competition’, 
in: Mark Armstrong and Robert Porter (eds) Handbook of 
Industrial Organization (Elsevier 2007), 2221, 2224 ff.
against prices.17 If it is assumed that people with a 
higher willingness to pay will not forego purchasing 
insurance despite higher individual premiums, price 
discrimination will also contribute to an expansion of 
insurance coverage in the population. The economic 
effect of the individualisation of insurance premiums 
is therefore positive.
C. Insurance Law
I. Preliminary Remarks
12 In Switzerland, the business of insurance is regulated 
by the Federal Constitution (FC)18 and several federal 
acts. The insurance landscape is divided into two 
sectors: the social or public law sector and the 
private law sector. In the public law sector, there are 
ten social insurance branches that form the basis for 
social security;19 mandatory health insurance is one 
of them. Mandatory health insurance is guided by the 
principle of solidarity of the insured persons20 and 
its benefits are determined by statutory catalogue.21 
Anyone wishing to take out insurance cover in excess 
of benefits granted by the statutory catalogue must 
assume supplementary health insurance governed 
by private law. Swiss health insurances are conceived 
as individual insurance plans, in mandatory health 
insurance and in supplementary health insurance, 
as well as in all other types of private insurance.22 
Automobile insurance and insurance on contents 
are part of the private law sector. The supervision 
of mandatory health insurance is exercised by the 
Federal Office of Public Health,23 whereas supervision 
17 Florent Thouvenin, ‘Dynamische Preise’ (2016) Jusletter IT 
dated 22. September 2016, para 5ff.
18 E.g. Art. 98 para 3 Federal Constitution (Bundesverfassung 
der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft vom 18. April 1999, 
SR 101) for private insurance or Art. 117 para 1 FC for health 
and accident insurance (Rolf H. Weber and Rainer Baisch, 
Versicherungsaufsichtsrecht (2nd edn, Stämpfli Verlag 2017), 
41ff.).
19 Stephan Furrer, Schweizerisches Privatversicherungsrecht 
(Schulthess 2011) point 2.31.
20 Gertrud E. Bollier, Leitfaden schweizerische Sozialversicherung, 
vol I (15th edn, Kantonale Drucksachen- & 
Materialienzentrale 2018) 411.
21 Stefan Felder, ‘Ökonomische Überlegungen zum 
Kontrahierungszwang in der Obligatorischen 
Krankenpflegeversicherung’ (2018) 62 Schweizerische 
Zeitschrift für Sozialversicherung und berufliche Vorsorge, 
95, 95.
22 Ueli Kieser, ‘Art. 3 KVG‘ in: Ueli Kieser and others (eds) KVG/
UVG Kommentar: Bundesgesetze über die Krankenversicherung, 
die Unfallversicherung und den Allgemeinen Teil des 
Sozialversicherungsrechts (ATSG) mit weiteren Erlassen (Orell 
Füssli 2018) para 1.
23 Art. 56 in conjunction with Art. 34 of the Federal 
Act on the Supervision of Social Health Insurance 
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of private insurances pursuant to the Insurance 
Supervision Act (ISA)24 is exercised by the Swiss 
Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA).25
13 In contrast to Switzerland, the insurance business 
in the U.S. is primarily regulated on a state level. 
Besides some federal statutes for health insurance 
and some limited monitoring of insurance, there is 
no significant federal insurance regulation.26 The 
insurance regulation primarily emanates from 
the courts, the state legislatures and the state 
regulatory agencies.27 This is particularly true for 
automobile insurance and insurance on contents, 
which is called tenant or renters insurance.28 The 
U.S. health insurance system differs from the 
Swiss system as it does not distinguish between 
mandatory and supplementary health insurance. 
The U.S. has no comprehensive national health 
insurance programme.29 Rather there are three 
different types of health insurance: public health 
care coverage, employer-provided health insurance, 
and individually purchased or small group insurance. 
The public health care insurance programmes are 
Medicare and Medicaid. Approximately 55-60% of 
health insurance policies are employer-provided 
through group insurance policies.30 Only a small 
portion of health insurances are taken out as 
individual policies.31
(Bundesgesetz betreffend die Aufsicht über die soziale 
Krankenversicherung vom 26. September 2014, SR 832.12).
24 Bundesgesetz betreffend die Aufsicht über 
Versicherungsunternehmen vom 17. Dezember 2004, 
SR 961.01.
25 Art. 46 ISA.
26 John F. Dobbyn and Christopher C. French, Insurance Law 
in a nutshell (5th edn, West Academic Publishing 2016) 501; 
Spencer Kook and Paul Rodriguez, ‘Overview of California 
insurance law’, in: Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP and Kristina 
Alexander (eds) California Insurance Law & Practice (Matthew 
Bender Inc. 2018) para 1.02[1], with further references. The 
Federal Insurance Office has the authority to monitor all 
aspects of the U.S. insurance industry (31 U.S.C. § 313).
27 Dobbyn and French (n 26) 501.
28 For the sake of simplicity, only the term “renters insurance” 
is used in this article.
29 Barry R. Furrow and others, Health Law (3rd edn, West 
Academic Publishing 2015) 400.
30 Dobbyn and French (n 26) 40 et. seq.; Statista, ‘Distribution 
of U.S. population with health insurance 2011-2017, 
by coverage’ <www.statista.com/statistics/235223/
distribution-of-us-population-with-health-insurance-by-
coverage/> accessed 25 March 2019.
31 The percentage of individually (direct) purchased health 
insurance policies increased from 9.8% in 2011 to 16% in 
2017 (ibid).
14 California’s insurance laws are enforced by the 
Insurance Commissioner.32 His functions and duties 
are exercised and performed by the California 
Department of Insurance (CDI).33 Furthermore, the 
Commissioner has the statutory right to supplement 
the California Insurance Code (INS)34 with rules and 
regulations. These administrative regulations are 
compiled in Chapter 5 of Title 10 of the California 
Code of Regulations (CCR), the codification of 
Californian administrative law.35
II. Switzerland
1. Mandatory Health Insurance
15 Mandatory health insurance in Switzerland is 
regulated by the Federal Health Insurance Act (HIA)36 
and the Ordinance on Health Insurance (OHI).37 These 
laws are authoritative in determining whether health 
insurance premiums may be personalised. Neither 
the HIA nor the OHI address the personalisation 
of insurance contracts specifically. The premiums 
are determined by health insurers and not by an 
authority.38 However, the principles governing 
the calculation of premiums for mandatory health 
insurance are set out in Art. 61ff. HIA and Art. 89ff. 
OHI. As a general rule and as far as the HIA does 
not provide for exceptions, health insurers have to 
charge the same premiums to all of their insured 
persons (unitary premium/premium per capita).39 
But an exhaustive list of criteria set forth by statute 
may be considered for adjusting the premiums 
to certain groups of insured and specific types of 
insurances. These criteria are place of residence,40 
age group (children, teenagers and adults),41 limited 
32 INS §§ 12900 and 12921; B.E. Witkin, ‘Chapter II. Insurance’ 
in: Summary of California Law (11th edn, Witkin Legal Institute 
2018) para 9(2); Kook and Rodriguez (n 26) para 1.08[1].
33 INS § 12906; Kook and Rodriguez (n 26) para 1.08[1].
34 Cf. California Legislative Information, <https://leginfo.
legislature.ca.gov/faces/codesTOCSelected.xhtml?toc
Code=INS&tocTitle=+Insurance+Code+-+INS>, accessed 
1 May 2019.
35 Kook and Rodriguez (n 26) para 1.08[1]; Witkin (n 32) 
para 6(2).
36 Bundesgesetz über die Krankenversicherung vom 18. März 
1994, SR 832.10.
37 Verordnung über die Krankenversicherung vom 27. Juni 
1995, SR 832.102.
38 Ueli Kieser, ‘Art. 61’ in: Ueli Kieser and others (eds) KVG/
UVG Kommentar: Bundesgesetze über die Krankenversicherung, 
die Unfallversicherung und den Allgemeinen Teil des 
Sozialversicherungsrechts (ATSG) mit weiteren Erlassen (Orell 
Füssli 2018) para 1. 
39 Art. 61 para 1 KVG. Kieser (n 38) para 3.
40 Art. 61 para 1, 2 and 2bis HIA.
41 Art. 61 para 3 and 3bis HIA.
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choice of service providers,42 choice of deductible43 
or bonus-related increases.44 Accordingly, there is no 
leeway for insurance companies to personalise the 
premiums in mandatory health insurance.
2. Other Insurances 
a.) Freedom of Contract
16 The question to what extent private insurers 
may individualise insurance contracts covering 
supplementary health benefits, automobile or 
renters insurance, is governed by the provisions of 
the Insurance Contract Act (ICA), the ISA and the 
associated Insurance Supervision Ordinance (ISO).45 
In private insurance law, the ICA supersedes the 
general provisions of the Code of Obligations (CO).46 
17 There is no provision in these insurance statutes 
which would standardise or even prohibit the 
individualisation of insurance contracts. In addition, 
the relationship with the insured person is governed 
by the freedom of contract principle, meaning there 
is no general obligation for insurance companies to 
conclude a specific insurance contract, neither for 
mandatory, nor for voluntary insurance.47 
18 However, mandatory law, public order and the right 
of personality set limits to freedom of contract in the 
area of private insurance.48 Furthermore, insurance 
contracts with an impossible, illegal or immoral 
content are void. But, in general, the individualisation 
42 Art. 62 para 1 HIA.
43 Art. 62 para 2 lit. a HIA, Art. 93ff. OHI.
44 Art. 62 para 2. lit. b HIA, Art. 96ff. OHI.
45 Bundesgesetz über den Versicherungsvertrag vom 2. April 
1908, SR 221.229.1 and Verordnung über die Beaufsichtigung 
von privaten Versicherungsunternehmen vom 9. November 
2005, SR 961.011.
46 Bundesgesetz betreffend die Ergänzung des Schweizerischen 
Zivilgesetzbuches (Fünfter Teil: Obligationenrecht) vom 30. 
März 1911, SR 220; Art. 100 para 1 ICA; Hardy Landolt and 
Stephan Weber, Privatversicherungsrecht in a nutshell (Dike 
2011) 20. If an aspect is not regulated by provisions of the ICA, 
the general provisions of the CO are applicable, as expressly 
stated in the ICA (Moritz W. Kuhn, Privatversicherungsrecht 
(Schulthess 2010) 98). Cf. on micro-segmentation and 
contractual norms: Weber (n 1) para 41.
47 Stephan Fuhrer, Schweizerisches Privatversicherungsrecht 
(Schulthess 2011) 66; Landolt and Weber (n 46) 38.
48 Art. 19 para 2 and Art. 20 para 1 CO; Kurt Pärli and 
others, ‘Ungleiche Prämien aufgrund von Nationalität, 
Alter und Geschlecht in der Motorfahrzeugversicherung 
– ein Diskriminierungsproblem? (2019) Haftung 
und Versicherung, 16, 23; Lanz (n 8) 155; Bernhard 
Waldmann, ‘Nationalitätsbedingte Erhöhung der 
Autoversicherungsprämien Kurzbegutachtung eines 
Einzelfalls von grundlegender Tragweite‘ (2007) Haftung 
und Versicherung, 65, 68.
of insurance contracts is neither impossible, nor a 
violation of public order or morality. With regard 
to legality, certain compelling requirements for 
insurance contracts are set forth by Art. 97ff ICA.49 
However, these provisions do not contain rules 
on individualisation either.50 Nevertheless, it is 
conceivable that individualisation of policies could 
lead to legally relevant discrimination against 
policyholders and hence would interfere with their 
right of personality. This question will be discussed 
in more detail below.51
b.) Protection against abusive behaviour
19 Even if private insurance law does not contain any 
specific provisions prohibiting the individualisation 
of insurance contracts - at least with regard to 
certain types of insurances - the insurers’ freedom 
of contract is limited by ISA’s provisions on the 
protection of the insured against abuse. The ISA’s 
objective is not only to protect the insured against 
the risks stemming from insurance companies 
becoming insolvent, but also to protect them 
against abusive practices of insurance companies.52 
Accordingly, the protection against abuse is part of 
FINMA’s mandate.53 However, FINMA’s respective 
supervisory competences differ for different types of 
insurance. While the legislator does not provide for a 
systematic preventive review of rates and conditions 
of most insurance contracts,54 the rates as well as 
the general terms and conditions of occupational 
pension schemes and supplementary health benefits 
insurance have to be submitted to FINMA for prior 
approval.55 For these two types of insurance, FINMA 
must grant the approval, if the proposed premiums 
do not jeopardise the solvency of the insurance 
company and do not lead to an abuse of the insured.56
49 See: Fuhrer (n 47) 42.
50 For further restrictions on freedom of contract in Swiss 
insurance law, see: Fuhrer (n 47) 99ff.
51 See below, D.
52 Art. 1 para 2 ISA. Rolf H. Weber, ‘Big Data – Rechtliche 
Grenzen von unbegrenzten Möglichkeiten‘ in: Stephan 
Fuhrer (ed) Jahrbuch Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Haftpflicht 
und Versicherung 2018 (Schulthess 2018), 87, 94.
53 Art. 46 para 1 lit. f ISA.
54 Monica Mächler, ‘Art. 1 ISA‘ in: Peter Ch. Hsu and Eric Stupp 
(eds) Basler Kommentar Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz (Helbing 
Lichtenhahn 2013) para 51; Weber (n 52) 87. On the occasion 
of the revision of the ISA in 2003, there was a change from 
a preventive to a subsequent control of insurance products, 
see: Swiss Federal Council, Botschaft vom 9. Mai 2003 zu einem 
Gesetz betreffend die Aufsicht über Versicherungsunternehmen 
(Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz, ISA) und zur Änderung des 
Bundesgesetzes über den Versicherungsvertrag (BBl 2003) 3789, 
3790ff. and 3798ff.
55 Art. 4 para 2 lit. r ISA.
56 Art. 38 ISA; Bernhard Rütsche, Aufsicht im Bereich der 
Krankenzusatzversicherungen (Schulthess 2017) point 20.
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20 Other private insurances, such as automobile 
insurance or insurance on contents, are not subject 
to comparable rules. With regard to these types 
of insurances, the question whether FINMA may 
and must intervene depends on how the notion of 
“abuse” pursuant to Art. 1 ISA is construed.57 While 
it is clear that FINMA has a statutory competence to 
protect the insured against abuse,58 it is contested 
whether FINMA must take general action against 
abuses.59 Narrower interpretations suggest that 
the overall aim of preventing abuse shall merely 
guide the interpretation and application of the 
provisions of ISA, but does not serve as a separate 
legal basis for intervention by FINMA.60 If one follows 
this view, FINMA can merely intervene against 
the individualisation of rates requiring approval, 
i.e. the rates for occupational pension schemes 
and supplementary health benefits insurance.61 
According to a broader interpretation, an 
intervention to prevent abuse is generally possible. 
This is the view taken by the Swiss Federal Council, 
who specified the notion of abuse in Art. 117 ISO and 
inter alia qualified legally or actuarially unjustified 
substantial differentiations as abusive.62 However, 
the effect of this provision is unclear as scholars 
rightly question the Federal Council’s competence 
to enshrine such substantial obligations in an 
implementing ordinance such as the ISO.63
21 Even if one assumes, however, that FINMA is 
generally competent to take action against abuse 
with regard to all types of insurance, this does not 
preclude the individualisation of insurance contracts 
since varying conditions and premiums for individual 
customers cannot be qualified as abuse – at least as 
far as they are actuarially justified. This is probably 
always the case with individualisation according to 
57 Cf. Rütsche (n 56) point 62; Weber and Baisch (n 18) 143; 
Shelby du Pasquier and Valérie Menoud ‘Art. 46 ISA‘ 
in: Peter Ch. Hsu and Eric Stupp (eds) Basler Kommentar 
Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz (Helbing Lichtenhahn 2013) 
para 13.
58 Art. 1 para 2 ISA and Art. 46 para 1 lit. f ISA.
59 Cf. Hubert Stöckli, ‘Totalrevision VVG: Probebohrungen im 
Entwurf des Bundesrates‘ (2012) Schweizerische Juristen-
Zeitung, 505, 513; Fuhrer (n 47) 556; as well as du Pasquier 
and Menoud (n 57) para 13, 33, 37; without restrictions to 
Art. 46 para 1 (f) ISA: Weber and Baisch (n 18) 210; Waldmann 
(n 48) 65 and 75, also assumes that pursuant to Art. 46 para 1 
lit. f ISA and Art. 117 para 2 ISO as well as of Art. 5 Abs. 3 FC 
FINMA must prevent discrimination.
60 Weber (n 52) 94. Cf. also Weber and Baisch (n 18) 44; Mächler 
(n 54) 53.
61 Art. 33 para 3 and Art. 38 ISA.
62 Art. 117 para 2 ISO.
63 For a discussion of this controversy cf. Florent Thouvenin, 
‘Privatversicherungen: Datenschutzrecht als Grenze der 
Individualisierung?’, in: Astrid Epiney and Déborah Sangsue 
(eds) Datenschutz und Gesundheitsrecht/Protection des données 
et droit de la santé (Schulthess 2019), 15, 23; Weber (Fn. 52) 95.
the risk profile.64 While an individualisation based 
on the willingness to pay cannot be justified from 
an actuarial point of view, the concept of abuse does 
not imply an obligation for equal treatment. As a 
consequence, this form of individualisation should 
also be permissible under Swiss insurance law, 
especially since it has positive economic effects.65
III. U.S./California
1. Health Insurance
22 In the U.S., health insurance is regulated on the 
federal level in the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA)66 and the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA).67 On a Californian 
state level, all health insurance policies marketed, 
issued or delivered to a California resident are 
subject to the provisions of the California Insurance 
Code (INS).68 The California Department of Insurance 
is responsible for regulating all entities engaged in 
the business of health insurance, with the exception 
of managed care plans.69 Such managed care plans 
are subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the 
Department of Managed Health Care (DMHC).70
64 See above, B.I.
65 See above, B.II.
66 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, 42 
U.S.C., § 18001.
67 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
of 1996, 26 U.S.C., § 9801. Notably, employer-provided 
health insurance coverage may also be subject to ERISA 
(Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1001 to 1461 [1974], which imposes various 
requirements considering participation, funding, vesting 
and enforcement of rights under employee benefit plans 
(cf. Justice H. Walter Croskey and others, ‘Chapter 6: First 
Party Coverages’, California Practice Guide: Insurance Litigation 
(The Rutter Group 2017) para 1420ff.).
68 Witkin (n 32) para 169.
69 Managed care plans do not qualify as insurance companies 
and they are not regulated by the INS or administrative 
regulations issued under it (Witkin (n 32) para 170). 
Managed care plans, in California characterised as health 
care service plans (Cal. Health & Saf.C. § 1345(f)), ensure 
the provision and payment of health services to its 
members through contracts with health care providers (e.g. 
doctors, hospitals, etc.). Different types of managed care 
contracts, like full-service managed care plans (i.e. Health 
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs)), Medi-Cal managed 
care plans, Medicare Advantage plans, Preferred Provider 
Organizations (PPOs) and Point of Service (POS) plans are 
offered by managed care plans (cf. Witkin (n 32) para 170); 
Croskey and others (n 67) para 900.
70 Croskey and others (n 67) para 700.5ff.
2019
Florent Thouvenin, Fabienne Suter, Damian George and Rolf H. Weber
216 2
a.) Public health care coverage: 
Medicare & Medicaid
23 Medicare71 is a mandatory health insurance 
programme for people over the age of 65 or for people 
with certain disabilities or an end-stage kidney 
disease.72 It consists of four programmes, parts A 
(hospital insurance),73 B (voluntary supplemental 
medical insurance),74 C (private-sector alternative 
to Parts A and B),75 and D (outpatient prescription 
drugs),76 Medicare is administered by the Center 
on Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), which is 
part of the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS).77
24 Since Medicare is mostly funded by taxes on wages 
paid over lifetime,78 most people in the U.S. don’t pay 
a Part A premium when they enter retirement. The 
Premiums for all Medicare parts are determined79 
and depend on given factors like income, receipt of 
social security benefits or the Medicare part chosen 
(Part B, C or D).80 Therefore, an individualisation of 
these health insurance “contracts” is not possible.
25 Anyone enrolled in Medicare can purchase a 
privately offered Medicare supplement insurance 
(also called Medigap), which is sold as group or 
individual policy.81 The insured pay a monthly 
premium for Medigap82 and policies may only 
be designed in accordance with model forms 
approved by the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners.83 In California, Medigap policies 
have to be approved by the Commissioner84 and the 
71 42 U.S.C. § 1395-1395kkk-1; 42 C.F.R. Parts 405-426 and 482-
498; see Furrow and others (n 29) 403.
72 Dobbyn and French (n 26) 42ff; Robert H. Jerry and 
Douglas R. Richmond, Understanding Insurance Law (6th edn, 
LexisNexis 2018) 420.
73 Dobbyn and French (n 26) 43; U.S. Government, ‘What 
Medicare Covers’ <www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-
covers/what-part-a-covers> accessed 4 June 2019. 
74 Furrow and others (n 29) 401.
75 So called “Medicare Advantage”. Tom Baker and Kyle D. 
Logue, Insurance Law and Policy: Cases, Materials and Problems 
(4th edn, Wolters Kluwer 2017) 259.
76 Furrow and others (n 29) 401 et seq.
77 Furrow and others (n 29) 403.
78 Dobbyn and French (n 26) 43.
79 See U.S. Government, ‘Medicare costs at a glance’ <www.
medicare.gov/your-medicare-costs/costs-at-a-glance/
costs-at-glance.html>, accessed 4 June 2019.
80 See Harvey L. McCormick, Medicare and Medicaid Claims and 
Procedures (4th edn, Thomson West 2017) para 1:65. 
81 INS § 10192.4(m); 10 CCR § 2220.51.
82 U.S. Government, ‘What’s Medicare Supplement Insurance 
(Medigap)?’ <www.medicare.gov/supplements-other-
insurance/whats-medicare-supplement-insurance-
medigap> accessed 12 June 2019.
83 42 U.S.C. § 1395ss(p); Croskey and others (n 67) para 745.
84 INS §§ 10192.1 in connection with 10291.5, 10192.14(c) and 
premiums shall be calculated in accordance with 
accepted actuarial principles and practices.85 Pricing 
can be based on the actual age (age-rated premium), 
the age at the time the Medigap policy was taken 
out (issue age-rated premium), or may be the same 
for everyone living in a given territory (community 
rated premium).86 
26 Medicaid87 is an insurance programme for people 
who do not have the financial means to pay for health 
insurance themselves, aged or blind people in need 
of long-term care services, and disabled persons 
with low incomes.88 In California, the California 
Department of Health Services (DHS) is in charge 
of the administration of Medicaid (called Medi-Cal). 
As with Medicare, there is no leeway regarding 
the individualisation of Medicaid health insurance 
premiums: Eligible Californians receive Medicare 
respectively Medi-Cal as a benefit without paying a 
premium89 and the health benefits are determined 
by federal and state regulation.90 
b.) Employer-provided coverage 
(group health insurance) 
27 The most common way to get health insurance in 
the U.S. is through a group plan for employees.91 
Employers with more than 50 employees (large 
employers) are encouraged by the federal 
government to provide health insurance with 
minimum essential coverage.92 This so-called 
“employer-provided coverage” is usually purchased 
by the employer from an insurance company. Some 
large employers “self-insure” their employees.93 
However, even self-insuring employers often (have 
10191.15(c).
85 INS § 10192.14(a)(B).
86 U.S. Government, ‘Costs of Medigap policies’ <www.
medicare.gov/supplements-other-insurance/whats-
medicare-supplement-insurance-medigap/medigap-costs/
costs-of-medigap-policies>, accessed 4 June 2019.
87 Medicaid is codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 a-f; cf. McCormick 
(n 80) para 22:16.
88 Dobbyn and French (n 26) 44; Jerry and Richmond (n 72) 420.
89 California Department of Insurance, ‘Overview: Healthcare 
Coverage in California’ <www.insurance.ca.gov/01-
consumers/110-health/10-basics/overview.cfm> accessed 
25 March 2019.
90 See Furrow and others (n 29) 478ff.
91 Dobbyn and French (n 26) 40; see also: 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91.
92 Dobbyn and French (n 26) 41.
93 To self-insuring employers a different set of rules applies 
than to insurance policies or health plans, (California 
Department of Insurance, ‘Group (Employer-Based) Health 
Coverage’ <www.insurance.ca.gov/01-consumers/110-
health/10-basics/overview.cfm> accessed 12 June 2019.). 
Due to the length of this article, we decided not to take a 
closer look at these provisions for self-insuring employers.
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to) use a health insurer to administer the programme 
and manage the health benefits.94 Employer-
provided health insurance is predominantly taken 
out as a group policy. Group policies are usually 
underwritten on the basis of factors common to the 
group as a whole, such as type of job, average age, 
etc.95
28 Within the scope of the ACA, all products that are 
approved for sale in the group health insurance 
market must be offered to any individual or employer 
in the state, and the health insurer must accept any 
individual or employer that applies for any of those 
products (guaranteed availability of coverage).96 In 
California, group health insurance must be offered 
to all the employees of an employer.97 All group 
health insurance policies must be approved by the 
Commissioner before they are issued or delivered 
to any person in California.98 The approval of the 
Commissioner shall among others, prevent fraud, 
unfair trade practices, and economically unsound 
insurances.99 A group health insurance policy shall 
also not be approved if it contains any provision 
which is unintelligible, uncertain, ambiguous, or 
abstruse, or likely to mislead a person to whom the 
policy is offered, delivered or issued, or if it fails to 
conform in any respect with any law of California.100 
29 The framework of employer-provided coverage is 
set out in the master policy. The insurance company 
is bound by this master policy and can only include 
the factors specified therein in the risk assessment 
of an individual employee. Thus, the leeway for 
individualisation of policies will be very limited for 
the group health insurance. 
c.) Individual and small group market
30 People who are not covered by one of the 
aforementioned governmental programmes or 
by their employer, can get health insurance from 
a private insurer on the individual or small group 
94 Dobbyn and French (n 26) 41; California Department of 
Insurance (n 93).
95 Croskey and others (n 67) para 1306.
96 45 CFR § 147.104. 
97 Group health insurance is regulated in INS §§ 10270-10400; 
Michael A.S. Newman and others, ‘Group life and Disability 
Insurance’ in: Kristina Alexander and Hinshaw & Culbertson 
(eds) California Insurance Law & Practice (Matthew Bender 
2018) vol 3, para 30.30 and 30.31[1].
98 INS §§ 10270.9 and 10290; Richard B. Hopkins, ‘The Health 
and Disability Insurance Contract’ in: Kristina Alexander 
and Hinshaw & Culbertson (eds) California Insurance Law & 
Practice, vol 2 (Matthew Bender 2018) para 26.11; Ellena v. 
Department of Ins., 230 Cal. App. 4th 198 [2014].
99 INS § 10291.5(a)(1). 
100 INS § 10270.95 in connection with INS § 10291.5(b)(1) & (13).
market.101 On the individual market, individuals 
take out the insurance policy themselves, while the 
small group market provides group health plans 
maintained by a small employer.102 The policy of 
an individually-purchased insurance is based on 
the buyer’s risk profile and the premium is equal 
to the price the insurer deems adequate to insure 
said risk.103 
31 Under the ACA, insurance premiums shall be “fair”. 
As a result, the rating factors for health insurance 
policies on the individual or small group market are 
community rated and subject to limited adjustments 
based on age, geographic area, individual or family 
unit, and tobacco use.104 Insurers must maintain a 
state-wide risk pool for both the individual market 
and the small group market105 and are required to 
set an index rate for each pool for establishing the 
premium rates. The premium rates for individual and 
small group health insurance policies may only vary 
to a limited extent from the index rates.106 Also the 
health insurance policies for the individual market 
and the respective premium rates have to be filed 
with and approved by the Commissioner before they 
are issued or delivered to any person in California.107 
101 See: Dobbyn and French (n 26) 41ff; see INS § 10753 (q) (1) 
for the definition of a small employer in California with 
regard to insurance. See also: 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91.
102 US.legal.com, ‘Small Group Market (Health Care)’ <https://
definitions.uslegal.com/s/small-group-market-health-
care/> accessed 25 March 2019; see: INS § 10753 (q) (1) for 
the definition of a small employer in California with regard 
to insurance. See also: 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91.
103 James C. Castle and Paul Rodriguez, ‘The Insurance Contract’ 
in: Kristina Alexander and Hinshaw & Culbertson (eds) 
California Insurance Law & Practice, vol 2 (Matthew Bender 
2018) para 8.02[4].
104 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1)(A); 45 CFR § 147.102; Timothy 
Stoltzfus Jost, Special Report, ‘The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010’ in: Kristina Alexander and 
Hinshaw & Culbertson (eds) California Insurance Law & 
Practice (Matthew Bender 2018) vol 2, II[B]. In terms of age, 
the rate shall not vary by more than 3 to 1 for adults (42 
U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1)(A)(iii)). The rating factor for tobacco use 
shall not vary by more than 1.5 to 1 (42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)
(1)(A)(iv)). California, however, has prohibited the use of 
the rating factor for tobacco use for insurance policies on 
the individual or small group market (INS § 10753.14(b) for 
small group policies and INS § 10965.9(b) for individually 
purchased policies). See also: John K. DiMugno and Paul E.B. 
Glad, California Insurance Law Handbook (April 2018 Update, 
Thomson West) para 37A:3; 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(2)(A).
105 42 U.S.C. § 18032(c). Adam M. Cole, ‘Legal Opinion Pursuant to 
Insurance Code Section 12921.9 Regarding Premium Cross-
Subsidization Across Market Segments in Health Insurance’ 
(California Department of Insurance, 13 June, 2014) <www.
insurance.ca.gov/0250-insurers/0300-insurers/0200-
bulletins/bulletin-notices-commiss-opinion/opinions.
cfm>, 2.
106 INS §§ 10965.3(h)(2 et seq.), 10753.05(k)(2 et seq.), quod vide: 
45 CFR § 156.80(d)(2)); Adam M. Cole (n 105).
107 INS § 10290; Hopkins (n 98) para 26.11. 
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The INS contains a long list of circumstances under 
which the Commissioner shall not approve health 
insurance policies.108 Should the Commissioner find 
that the benefits provided under the policy are 
unreasonable in relation to the premium charged, 
he may withdraw an individual or mass-marketed 
policy’s approval.109 
32 As with group insurance, the ACA requires that 
all products that are approved for sale in the 
individual or small group market must be offered 
to any individual or employer in the state, and 
the health insurer must accept any individual or 
employer that applies for any of those products 
(guaranteed availability of coverage).110 Also 
California has enacted a detailed review process for 
rates increases when implementing the respective 
provisions of the ACA.111 If the CDI determines that 
a rate is unreasonable or not justified, the insurer 
shall notify the policyholder of this determination.112 
However, the Commissioner’s authority is limited to 
requesting rate changes; he cannot deny or approve 
proposed rate changes.113
33 The leeway for individualisation of individually 
purchased health insurance or small group health 
insurance is very limited. Especially since individual 
policies have to be based on one risk pool and the 
rates may only be adjusted with regard to geographic 
region, size of family, and age. The premiums also 
have to be based on the approved index rate, which 
will hinder individualisation. The requirements of 
the ACA, such as the guaranteed availability and 
renewability of coverage, are another obstacle for 
individualising insurance rates. Nevertheless, the 
requirements in connection with unreasonable 
rate increases do not reduce the leeway for 
individualisation, at least in those cases in which 
individualisation is based on the risk profile. 
Individualisation on the basis of risk will probably not 
be deemed “unreasonable” as long as it is actuarially 
sound. In the case of individualisation based on the 
willingness to pay, however, the requirement to 
inform customers about unreasonable rate increases 
could hinder such individualisation, provided that 
the criterion of the willingness to pay would meet 
the “unreasonable” threshold. Affected people could 
regard this practice as unfair and might switch 
insurers upon receiving a respective-notice.
108 See INS § 10291.5(b).
109 INS § 10293 (a), see also: 10 CCR § 2222.10-19. See John A. 
Gebauer and others, ‘Insurance Contracts and Coverage’, 
California Jurisprudence 3d (February 2019 Update) para 272.
110 45 CFR § 147.104.
111 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–94; 45 CFR § 154.200 - 45 CFR § 154.230; INS 
§§ 10181 - 10181.13.
112 INS §§ 10181.3(g) and 10199.1(d).
113 INS § 10181.3.
2. Property Insurance
a.) Preliminary remarks
34 Since the business of insurance in the U.S. is primarily 
regulated on a state level, there are no federal 
regulations on property-casualty insurance.114 On 
a Californian state level, most insurance on risk 
and operations are regulated in Proposition 103, 
an amendment of the Insurance Code adopted 
in 1988.115 Proposition 103 shall, among others, 
protect consumers from arbitrary insurance rates 
and practices. For all Californians, insurance must 
be fair, available, and affordable.116 No rate which 
is excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory 
shall be approved or remain in effect.117 By enacting 
Proposition 103 California has become a prior-
approval state and like most insurance on risk 
and operations, property-casualty insurances like 
homeowners, renters and automobile insurance are 
covered by Proposition 103.118 Thus, all property and 
casualty insurance rates have to be approved by 
California’s Insurance Commissioner prior to use.119
35 In February 2015 the Commissioner has prohibited 
price optimisation in his “Notice Regarding Unfair 
Discrimination in Rating: Prize Optimization”. Prize 
optimisation is therein defined as “any method of 
taking into account an individual’s or class’s willingness 
to pay a higher premium relative to other individuals 
or classes.” The Commissioner qualifies any form 
of price optimisation in the ratemaking process 
as unfairly discriminatory and as a violation of 
Californian law. This assessment is based on the 
finding that “Price Optimization does not seek to arrive at 
an actuarially sound estimate of the risk of loss and other 
future costs of a risk transfer.”120 Accordingly, there is 
no leeway for the personalisation of property and 
casualty insurance contracts based on an insured’s 
willingness to pay.
114 The business of insurance is almost exclusively regulated by 
the states, see: Baker and Logue (n 75) 631ff; Dobbyn and 
French (n 26) 501ff.
115 Article 10, Reduction and Control of Insurance Rates, INS §§ 
1861.01-1861.16. Witkin (n 32) para 11 (1).
116 Witkin (n 32) para 11(1); Richard G. De La Mora and Spencer 
Y. Kook, ‘Property-Casualty Insurance Ratemaking and 
Rate Regulation’ in: Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP and Kristina 
Alexander (eds) California Insurance Law & Practice (Matthew 
Bender Inc. 2018) para 6A.03.
117 INS § 1861.05(a).
118 Kook and Rodriguez (n 26) para 1.08[3].
119 INS § 1861.01(c); Kook and Rodriguez (n 26) para 1.03, [3] 
and para 1.07[3].
120 California Insurance Commissioner, Notice regarding unfair 
discrimination in rating: price optimization (Department of 
Insurance, State of California February 18, 2015) <www.
insurance.ca.gov/0250-insurers/0300-insurers/0200-
bulletins/bulletin-notices-commiss-opinion/upload/
PriceOptimization.pdf>. 
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b.) Renters Insurance
36 Renters insurance in California usually consists of 
different insurance coverages like personal property 
or liability insurance. In this paper we only analyse 
the regulation concerning the insurance of personal 
property. 
37 Neither Proposition 103, nor the INS contains specific 
requirements regarding property insurance and 
hence the general rules set forth by Proposition 103 
apply. Renters insurance premiums may not be 
excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory.121 
Premiums are deemed excessive if it is expected that 
the insurance company will generate an excessive 
profit122 and they are considered inadequate if they 
are expected to prevent an efficient insurance 
company from generating an adequate return.123 To 
investigate whether an insurance rate is excessive 
or inadequate, the Commissioner has to balance the 
interest of the insured in favourable prices with the 
insurance companies’ interest in high earnings. He 
also has to take into account that certain insurance 
policies are in the general public’s interest or legally 
prescribed.124 A so-called “ratemaking formula” is 
used to distinguish appropriate from inadequate 
or excessive rates. The formula must be applied 
by all insurers and sets forth the maximum125 and 
minimum126 permitted earned premium. Rates 
within this range can be described as “fair and 
reasonable” and “constitutional”.127 Nevertheless, 
the Commissioner still may assess on a case-by-case 
basis whether a rate is “unfairly discriminatory”. 
Notably, there are no rules and regulations specifying 
how this assessment shall be made in connection 
with property-casualty insurance.128 
c.) Automobile Insurance
38 The aforementioned system of pre-approval of 
insurance rates also applies to automobile insurance. 
In addition, Proposition 103 has set forth additional 
requirements for automobile insurance.129 The 
permitted rate-making factors are determined and 
given a hierarchy in INS § 1861.02(a). These are in 
121 INS § 1861.05(a).
122 10 CCR § 2642.1.
123 10 CCR § 2642.3.
124 See: 10 CCR § 2642.1; 10 CCR § 2642.3.
125 10 CCR § 2644.2.
126 10 CCR § 2644.3.
127 Cf. De La Mora and Kook (n 116) para 6A.03 and [8][f]ff; The 
California Supreme Court endorsed the formula, cf. 20th 
Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, 8 Cal. 4th 216 [1994].
128 De La Mora and Kook (n 116) para 6A.04(2). But compare 
D.III. with regard to anti-discrimination laws.
129 De La Mora and Kook (n 116) para 6A.04, [5][a].
decreasing order of importance: (1) the insured’s 
driving safety record; (2) the number of miles driven 
annually; (3) the years of driving experience; and (4) 
other factors that have a substantial relationship to 
the risk of loss and that were set forth in a regulation 
adopted by the Commissioner. The Commissioner 
has specified sixteen such optional rating factors.130 
Insurers can base their premiums on these factors 
as well. However, these optional rating factors 
must not be weighted greater than the weight of 
the third mandatory factor, i.e. the years of driving 
experience.131 The use of rating factors not set forth 
in the CCR is prohibited.132 Considering any other 
criteria without approval would constitute unfair 
discrimination.133 
39 While insurers can take the insured’s driving safety 
record into account, this does not mean that they 
may use crash recorder data for ratemaking, since 
the law sets forth clear limits with regard to what 
data may be used in rate-making.134 Insurers may 
consider the amount of annually driven miles, but 
usually base this factor on an own estimation or an 
estimation by the policyholder. While insurers are 
free to offer rates that are based on verified actual 
mileage rather than estimated mileage, participation 
in these actual mileage programmes is purely 
voluntary.135
130 According to 10 CCR § 2632.5(d)(l)-(16) these are: type 
of vehicle; vehicle performance capabilities, including 
alterations made subsequent to original manufacture; type 
of use of vehicle (pleasure only, commute, business, farm, 
commute mileage, etc.); percentage use of the vehicle 
by the rated driver; multi-vehicle households; academic 
standing of the rated driver; completion of driver training 
or defensive driving courses by the rated driver; vehicle 
characteristics, including engine size, safety and protective 
devices, damageability, reparability, and theft deterrent 
devices; gender of the rated driver; marital status of the 
rated driver; persistency (only for renewal of policy, see 
California Insurance Law Dictionary and Desk Reference (2018 
edn, Thomson West) para P36.5); non-smoker; secondary 
driver characteristics; multi-policies with the same, or an 
affiliated, company; relative claims frequency or relative 
claims severity.
131 De La Mora and Kook (n 116) para 6A.04, [5][c]; cf. Spanish 
Speaking Citizens’ Foundation, Inc. v. Low, 85 Cal.App.4th 1179 
[2000], 1221.
132 10 CCR § 2632.4(a). 
133 INS § § 1861.02(a)(4)
134 For example, public records on convictions may be 
considered. Cf. 10 CCR § 2632.5(c)(1)). De La Mora and Kook 
(n 116) para 6A.04, [5][c].
135 (10 CCR § 2632.5(c)(2)(E) & (F)). De La Mora and Kook (n 116) 
para 6A.04, [5][c].
2019
Florent Thouvenin, Fabienne Suter, Damian George and Rolf H. Weber
220 2
IV. Findings
40 While Switzerland and the U.S./California apply a 
very different approach for providing health care 
insurance, both jurisdictions align with regard 
to the limited leeway for the individualisation of 
health insurance contracts. In Switzerland, the 
individualisation of mandatory health insurance is 
not allowed, while there is quite some leeway for the 
individualisation of supplementary health insurance 
if such individualisation does not qualify as an abuse. 
In the U.S./California, there is almost no leeway 
for the individualisation of insurance contracts 
in the health insurance market as this market is 
comprehensively regulated and leaves insurance 
companies with vanishingly little possibilities with 
regard to adjusting premiums on an individual level.
41 The regulatory approach in Switzerland and the 
U.S./California differs even more in other insurance 
markets, namely for automobile insurance and 
insurance on contents: In Switzerland, these types 
of insurance are based on the principle of freedom 
of contract. Therefore, insurance law does not limit 
the ability of insurance companies to individualise 
insurance contracts. One could be of a somewhat 
different opinion if it is assumed that FINMA is 
generally competent to take action against abuse 
and if it is argued that the individualisation of 
insurance contracts is to be qualified as an abuse. 
In our view, however, individual conditions and 
premiums cannot be qualified as abuse if they are 
actuarially justified, which should always be the case 
if the individualisation is based on the insured’s risk 
profile. In addition, the notion of abuse does not 
imply an obligation of equal treatment. Accordingly, 
the individualisation of insurance contracts should 
also be permissible under Swiss insurance law if it is 
based on the insureds’ willingness to pay.
42 In California, automobile and renters insurance are 
densely regulated and the rates are subject to prior 
approval by the California’s Insurance Commissioner. 
While this approach limits the flexibility of insurance 
companies considerably, it does not exclude the 
personalisation of insurance contracts per se. Rather, 
the degree of permitted individualisation depends on 
the concrete specifications according to which the 
insurance premiums must be determined and how 
adjustable-rates are approved by the Commissioner. 
In our opinion, a personalised insurance contract 
cannot be deemed excessive, inadequate or unfairly 
discriminatory as a premium which is specifically 
adjusted to the risk of an individual person can hardly 
be deemed excessive or inappropriate. This should 
particularly hold true for premiums that comply 
with accepted actuarial standards. However, the 
margin for individualisation appears fairly limited as 
the maximum and minimum permitted premium is 
determined by law. In addition, the personalisation 
of renters or automobile insurance based on the 
insured’s willingness to pay is straightforwardly 
prohibited in California. As a consequence, insurance 
companies in California have hardly any leeway to 
individualise insurance contracts.
D. Anti-discrimination Law
I. Preliminary Remarks
43 The personalisation of insurance contracts leads 
to people paying different premiums. This creates 
tensions with the constitutional principle of equal 
treatment, according to which individuals are 
to be treated equally as far as they possess equal 
characteristics. The equal treatment principle, 
however, does not prohibit all forms of differentiation 
and does not require unequal individuals to be 
treated equally. Yet, discriminating against certain 
protected characteristics is prohibited by the Swiss 
and the U.S. constitution. Thus, anti-discrimination 
law encompasses the question to what extent 
private parties are bound by the constitution. 
But anti-discrimination law is also found on a 
statutory level. In Switzerland, several specific 
statutes, as well as the general right to protection 
of personality enshrined in the Civil Code, need to 
be observed. Californian insurers are also subject 
to a variety of anti-discrimination laws on both the 
federal and the state level. The individualisation 
of insurance contracts thus has to navigate the 
conflicted interplay between contractual freedom 
and statutory limitations to discrimination. When 
doing so, distinguishing between different types of 
insurances, as well as understanding the rationales 
for rate adjustment, is of utmost importance.136
II. Switzerland
1. Federal Constitution
44 The Federal Constitution’s non-discrimination 
principle determines that no-one may be 
discriminated against on the grounds of origin, 
race, sex, age, language, social position, way of life, 
religious, ideological or political conviction, or on 
the grounds of physical, mental or psychological 
disability (so-called “protected characteristics”).137 
The primary addressee is the state,138 but the 
136 Cf. Bitter and Uphues (n 2) 148ff.
137 Art. 8 para 2 FC.
138 Giovanni Biaggini, ‘Art. 8 BV’ in: Giovani Biaggini (ed) 
Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft: 
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non-discrimination principle is also binding on 
private individuals performing public functions,139 
such as insurance companies offering mandatory 
health insurance.140 When offering such insurance, 
insurance companies may not take protected 
characteristics into account when exercising their 
actuarial discretion within the limits set by health 
insurance law.141
45 In contrast, the providers of private insurances, 
such as supplementary health, automobile or 
renters insurance are not directly bound by the 
constitutional non-discrimination principle.142 
Nevertheless, the constitution requires authorities 
to ensure that fundamental rights also become 
effective among private individuals, to the extent 
that the fundamental right in question is suitable 
for such “horizontal” application.143 This also applies 
to FINMA, the authority supervising the insurance 
sector. Thus, FINMA must take account of the 
prohibition of discrimination in the application of 
the laws regulating the insurance sector, particularly 
when interpreting legal terms.144
46 For the individualisation of insurance contracts, this 
assessment could be relevant when construing and 
applying the concept of “abuse” in the ISA. If one 
follows the view that neither the ISA’s objective145 
nor FINMA’s statutory competences146 serve as a basis 
for intervention by the supervisory authority,147 the 
question of giving effect to the non-discrimination 
principle between private individuals arises only 
when examining the rates that are subject to 
approval; i.e. the rates for occupational pensions 
and supplementary health insurance.148 Here, 
FINMA must take due account of the prohibition 
of discrimination when interpreting the concept of 
abuse.
Kommentar (Orell Füssli 2017) para 18.
139 Art. 35 para 2 FC.
140 See: Swiss Federal Court (unpublished case no 5P.97/2006) 
[2006] at 3.3.
141 See above, C.II.1.
142 See Swiss Federal Court (BGE 129 III 35) [2003] at 5.2; critical 
Kurt Pärli‚‘Urteil des Bundesgerichts 5P.97/2006 vom 1. Juni 
2006’ (2007) Haftung und Versicherung, 46, 48 ff.; cf. below, 
D.II.4, on the protection against discrimination derived 
from the right to respect one’s personality.
143 Art. 35 para 3 FC.
144 Advocating an interpretation in the light of fundamental 
rights: Jörg Paul Müller, Verwirklichung der Grundrechte nach 
Art. 35 BV (Stämpfli Verlag 2018) 103 ff.
145 Art. 1 ISA.
146 Art. 46 ISA.
147 See above, C.II.2.b).
148 Art. 4 para 2 lit. r in conjunction with Art. 38 ISA.
47 At least in this area,149 FINMA is mandated to intervene 
if an insurance company were to individualise the 
conditions based on a protected characteristic 
since such discrimination could be qualified as an 
abuse.150 This applies to direct as well as indirect 
discrimination. As opposed to direct discrimination, 
which is taking place if an insurer discriminates 
the conditions of an insurance contract based on 
a protected characteristic, indirect discrimination 
takes place when the insurer does not account for 
a protected characteristic in its individualisation 
process, but the actual effects of individualisation 
would be particularly disadvantageous for people 
possessing a protected characteristic.151 However, 
the existence of discrimination always requires 
the existence of a qualified unequal treatment of a 
protected group of persons. According to prevailing 
case law, this requires that the distinguishing feature 
being used as discriminant constitutes an essential 
element of the identity of the person concerned and 
is impossible or very difficult to give up.152 Further, 
using a protected characteristic as discriminant can 
be justified if three conditions are met:153 first, there 
must be an objective reason for the differentiation; 
second, it must pursue a legitimate aim; and third, 
the differential treatment needs to be proportionate 
to that aim.154 As insurance companies will base the 
individualisation on objective reasons such as an 
insured’s risk profile or willingness to pay while 
pursuing the legitimate aim of attracting additional 
customers, increasing their turnover, and fighting 
adverse selection and moral hazard, it is likely 
that the individualisation based on protected 
characteristics will be justified on a regular basis 
and is therefore not to be considered as an abuse in 
the sense of the ISA.
149 A more extensive interpretation of FINMA’s mandate has 
been proposed, see above, C.II.2.b).
150 Same opinion Waldmann (n 48) 69.
151 Swiss Federal Court (BGE 139 I 169) [2013] at 7.2.1ff.; Swiss 
Federal Court (BGE 129 I 217) [2003] at 2.1; Biaggini (n 138) 
para 20, with further references; Rainer J. Schweizer 
‘Art. 8 BV in: Bernhard Ehrenzeller and others (eds) Die 
Schweizerische Bundesverfassung: St. Galler Kommentar (Dike 
and Schulthess 2014) para 51, with further references.
152 Swiss Federal Court (BGE 141 I 241) [2015] at 4.3.2; Swiss 
Federal Court (BGE 139 I 169) [2013] at 8.2.1; Swiss Federal 
Court (BGE 135 I 49) [2009] at 4.1; Swiss Fedral Court (BGE 
134 I 49) [2008] at 3.1; Swiss Federal Court (BGE 126 II 377) 
[2000] at 6.
153 Biaggini (n 138) para 22; Schweizer (n 151) para 48; Swiss 
Federal Court (BGE 141 I 241) [2015] at 4.3.2; Swiss Federal 
Court (BGE 139 I 169) [2013] at 8.2.2.
154 Biaggini (n 138) para 26; Schweizer (n 151) para 54, 
with further references. However, the requirements 
for justification are not identical for all protected 
characteristics and there is no room for justification at all 
for certain characteristics, see: Biaggini (n 138) para 25; 
Schweizer (n 151) para 48.
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2. Federal Act on the Elimination 
of Disadvantages of Persons 
with Disabilities (EDPD)
48 The Federal Act on the Elimination of Disadvantages 
for Persons with Disabilities (EDPD)155 intends to 
prevent, reduce or eliminate disadvantages to which 
people with disabilities are exposed.156 With this aim 
in mind, private individuals offering services to the 
public must not discriminate against disabled people 
on the basis of their disability.157 This also applies to 
private insurances.158 Discrimination occurs when 
people with disabilities are treated in a radically 
different and disadvantageous way, with the aim or 
the consequence of degrading them or excluding 
them from services.159 However, the EDPD does not 
oblige private individuals to take certain (positive) 
measures to eliminate actual disadvantages, or to 
refrain from differentiating between customers.160 
In the event of discrimination, only compensation 
of no more than CHF 5’000 can be claimed.161 The Act 
does not confer the right to conclude a contract.162
49 These requirements hardly impose any restrictions 
on the individualisation of insurance contracts. First 
of all, the legislator has made it clear that the law 
merely aims at preventing particularly unacceptable 
behaviour by private individuals lacking any 
tolerance that members of the society owe to each 
other.163 Insurance companies do not exclude people 
with disabilities because of their disability, but 
because their disability represents a financial risk. 
Differentiating according to this risk is objectively 
justifiable.164 It is therefore only questionable 
whether exclusion or degradation could be an 
(indirect) consequence of individualisation. The 
risk of exclusion cannot be ruled out, at least in the 
155 Bundesgesetz über die Beseitigung von Benachteiligungen 
von Menschen mit Behinderungen vom 13. Dezember 2002, 
SR 151.3.
156 Art. 1 para 1 EDPD.
157 Art. 6 EDPD.
158 Similar opinion: Pärli (n 142) 50; Swiss Federal Court 
(unpublished case no 5P.97/2006) [2006] at 4.2, in the case 
of supplementary health insurance.
159 Art. 2 lit. d Federal Ordinance on the Elimination of 
Disadvantages for Persons with Disabilities (Verordnung 
über die Beseitigung von Benachteiligungen von Menschen 
mit Behinderungen vom 19. November 2003, SR 151.31).
160 Swiss Federal Council, Botschaft vom 11. Dezember 2000 zur 
Volksinitiative «Gleiche Rechte für Behinderte» und zum Entwurf 
eines Bundesgesetzes über die Beseitigung von Benachteiligungen 
behinderter Menschen (BBl 2001) 1715, 1780; see Swiss Federal 
Court (unpublished case no 5P.97/2006) [2006] at 4.1.
161 Art. 8 para 3 in conjunction with Art. 11 para 2 EDPD.
162 Swiss Federal Court (unpublished case no 5P.97/2006) [2006] 
at 4.1.
163 Swiss Federal Council (n 160) 1780.
164 Same opinon: Pärli (n 142) 51.
event of refusal to offer supplementary insurance. 
However, the access to health care as such is not at 
stake, as insurance companies are prohibited from 
excluding disabled people from mandatory health 
insurance. As the threshold has been set very high 
(particularly unacceptable behaviour), the refusal to 
offer supplementary insurance will hardly meet the 
requirements of the EDPD.
3. Federal Act on Human 
Genetic Testing (HGTA)
50 Insurers could use genetic tests for individualised 
risk-assessments and discriminate against individuals 
based on the conclusions that can be drawn from 
the results of genetic tests. However, the use of 
genetic information is constitutionally prohibited 
unless authorised by consent or law.165 The Federal 
Act on Human Genetic Testing (HGTA) sets forth 
conditions under which human genetic testing may 
be performed in the context of insurance.166 First and 
above all, insurance providers are prohibited from 
requiring pre-symptomatic or pre-natal genetic tests 
prior to providing insurance.167 For certain types of 
insurance, such as mandatory health insurance, 
supplementary health insurance, and insurance 
for illness and maternity leave, the prohibition on 
utilising or requesting genetic tests is absolute.168 
For other types of insurance, the insurance provider 
may require applicants to disclose previously taken 
pre-symptomatic genetic tests if these tests provide 
reliable results and are of demonstrable scientific 
value from a technical and a medical practice 
perspective.169
51 These provisions shall balance the interests between 
persons seeking out insurance and the insurance 
companies’ interest in comprehensive information 
on the insured.170 However, the prohibition merely 
covers the utilisation of pre-symptomatic and 
pre-natal genetic tests. Information obtained 
from genetic testing for diagnosis is not covered. 
Nevertheless, the HGTA stipulates that, in general, 
no one shall be discriminated against on the basis of 
genetic information.171
165 Art. 117 para 2 lit. f FC.
166 Art. 1 lit. c HGTA.
167 Art. 26 HGTA.
168 Art. 27 HGTA.
169 Art. 28 para 1 HGTA.
170 Swiss Federal Council, Botschaft zum Bundesgesetz über 
genetische Untersuchungen beim Menschen vom 11. September 
2002 (BBl 2002) 7361, 7438; Lanz (n 8) 23.
171 Art. 4 HGTA. Cf. Claudia Mund, Grundrechtsschutz und 
genetische Information, Basler Studien zur Rechtswissenschaft, 
vol 71 (Helbing Lichtenhahn 2005) 266ff.
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4. Right to respect one’s personality
52 There is no general prohibition of discrimination 
in Swiss private law.172 Legal scholars, however, 
derive such a protection from the right to respect 
one’s personality enshrined in Art. 28 of the Civil 
Code (CC).173 It is argued, for example, that this 
provision could act as an indirect prohibition of 
discrimination under private law, because unequal 
treatment on the basis of characteristics of a person 
which are protected by the right to respect one’s 
personality constitutes a violation of personality.174 
Other scholars even derive a right to non-
discriminatory treatment from the right to respect 
one’s personality.175
53 It is not immediately clear which characteristics 
are to be taken into account when determining 
discrimination as a violation of the right to respect 
one’s personality, since the protection of this right 
is not limited to certain characteristics of a person 
but protects the personality as a whole. However, it 
seems logical to construe the relevant characteristics 
for a violation of personality with the protected 
characteristics mentioned in the non-discrimination 
principle in the Federal Constitution.176 In fact, the 
constitutionally protected characteristics, such as 
gender, nationality, race, age, state of health, sexual 
preferences, political views or religious affiliation, are 
regularly referenced in the literature.177 As always, 
172 Ruth Arnet, Freiheit und Zwang beim Vertragsschluss 
(Stämpfli Verlag 2008) para 356; Andreas Bucher, Natürliche 
Personen und Persönlichkeitsschutz (Helbing Lichtenhahn 
2009) para 433; for an overview cf: Tarek Naguib, 
‘Diskriminierende Verweigerung des Vertragsabschlusses 
über Dienstleistungen Privater: Diskriminierungsschutz 
zwischen Normativität, Relativität und Idealität‘ 
(2009) Allgemeine Juristische Praxis, 993, 1005; Bettina 
Hürlimann-Kaup/Jörg Schmid, Einleitungsartikel des ZGB und 
Personenrecht (Schulthess 2016) para 1100; Samantha Besson, 
L’égalité horizontale: l’égalite de traitement entre particuliers 
(Fribourg: Editions Universitaires 1999) para 1240 ff.; 
Herbert Trachsler, Das privatrechtliche Gleichbehandlungsgebot 
(Dike 1991) 3ff. and 188ff. 
173 Arnet (n 172) point 356; Peter Gauch and others, 
OR AT: Band 1 (Schulthess 2014) para 1111; Tarkan 
Göksu, Rassendiskriminierung beim Vertragsabschluss als 
Persönlichkeitsverletzung (Freiburg: Universitätsverlag 2003) 
para 214ff.; Naguib (n 172) 1005ff.
174 Arnet (n 172) para 356.
175 Naguib (n 172) 1006; Pärli and others (n 48) 28.
176 See above, D.II.1.
177 Roger Zäch, ‘Der Einfluss von Verfassungsrecht auf 
das Privatrecht bei der Rechtsanwendung‘ (1989) 
Schweizerische Juristen-Zeitung, 25, 26; Peter Gauch and 
others (n 173) para 1111. By referring to these criteria, 
specific, personality-forming and often unchangeable 
characteristics are qualified as relevant; some authors 
argue that the impairment of such characteristics is a 
pre-requisite for the existence of discrimination (Tarkan 
Göksu, ‘Drittwirkung der Grundrechte im Bereich des 
Persönlichkeitsschutzes‘ (2009), Schweizerische Juristen-
Zeitung, 89, 99).
a certain severity of the impairment is required as 
a threshold for a violation of personality.178 To give 
an example, the Federal Supreme Court has stated 
that only an offensive disregard of an employee’s 
personality will qualify as discrimination against 
that employee.179
54 It is generally accepted that a discriminatory 
contract formation can also be qualified as a violation 
of personality.180 Discrimination is inadmissible not 
only if the conclusion of a contract is refused, but 
also if a contract is concluded on less favourable 
terms for reasons that are unrelated to the subject 
of the contract and that are infringing the right to 
respect one’s personality.181 This may be the case 
when insurance contracts are individualised, in 
particular when the conditions are determined on 
the basis of gender, age or nationality.
55 However, personality-infringing discrimination 
can be justified, namely by an overriding private 
interest.182 This is the case if the insurance company 
can show objective reasons for individualisation 
based on protected characteristics which outweigh 
the interest in not being evaluated based on such 
characteristics.183 If an offer is individualised on 
the basis of the risk profile, this should qualify as 
justifying overriding private interest. The same holds 
true when the premium is calculated with regard to 
the willingness to pay. In both constellations it is 
decisive that the individualisation is not based on 
a protected characteristic, but on other criteria. A 
mere correlation of risk profile or willingness to pay 
with a protected characteristic will therefore not 
establish an unlawful violation of personality.
178 Heinz Hausheer and Regina E. Aebi-Müller, Das Personenrecht 
des Schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuches (Stämpfli Verlag 2016) 
point 12.06; Andreas Meili, ‘Art. 28 ZGB‘ in: Heinrich Honsell 
and others (eds) Basler Kommentar Zivilgesetzbuch I: Art. 1-456 
ZGB (Helbing Lichtenhahn 2014) para 38; Regina E. Aebi-
Müller, ‘Art. 28 ZGB‘ in: Peter Breitschmid and Alexandra 
Rumo-Jungo (eds), Handkommentar zum Schweizer Privatrecht, 
Personen- und Familienrecht, Partnerschaftsgesetz: Art. 1-456 ZGB, 
PartG (Schulthess 2016) para 3; Sibylle Hofer and Stephanie 
Hrubesch-Millauer, Einleitungsartikel und Personenrecht 
(Stämpfli Verlag 2012) point 20.11.
179 Swiss Federal Court (BGE 129 III 276) [2003] at 3.1.
180 Peter Gauch and others (n 173) para 1111; Göksu (n 173) point 
274 ff., 312; Naguib (n 172) 1005ff; Arnet (n 172) point 357 
and 363; Zäch (n 177) 25ff.; with regard to insurance law: 
Stephan Hartmann, ‘Der Schutz der Versicherten vor 
Missbräuchen im revidierten Aufsichtsrecht‘ (2007) Haftung 
und Versicherung, 30, 33, with further references.
181 Göksu (n 173) para 199ff; Peter Gauch and others (n 173) 
para 1111a.
182 Art. 28 para 2 ZGB.
183 Arnet (n 172) para 371. For the balancing of interests in 
the context of justification see also: Hofer and Hrubesch-
Millauer (n 178) para 2069; Hausheer and Aebi-Müller 
(n 178) para 12.23; Aebi-Müller (n 178) 32.
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56 If, however, there is no justification, the person whose 
personality has been infringed is not only entitled 
to injunctive relief, damages and satisfaction,184 
but also to the conclusion of a contract on non-
discriminatory terms.185
III. U.S./California
1. Federal Anti-discrimination Law
57 In the U.S., the constitutional prohibition of 
discrimination is only binding on governmental units 
and officers and does not apply to private insurers.186 
However, next to this constitutional prohibition, 
there is a variegated body of anti-discrimination 
laws consisting of federal laws and state regulations 
applying to businesses and legal entities.187 Some of 
these laws are pertinent to the business of insurance 
as they limit the types of permitted discrimination. 
These are ACA, HIPAA and the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA).188 These acts are the 
only federal laws expressly forbidding insurers 
from engaging in any form of discrimination in the 
underwriting process. On the federal level, there is 
no general prohibition for insurance companies to 
take, for example, race, religion, or national origin 
into account.189 Moreover, employers offering health 
insurance to their employees have to comply with the 
Civil Rights Act190 and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA),191 which prohibit discrimination based 
on various protected characteristics.192 Each of 
these Acts enumerates some prohibited grounds 
for discrimination (e.g. race, gender, health status), 
but there is no centralised agency for enforcing 
respective discriminatory cases.193
184 Art. 28a para 1 no. 1 f. and para 3 ZGB.
185 Peter Gauch and others (n 173) para 1111; Arnet (n 172) 
para 417ff; Göksu (n 173) para 660.
186 Julie C. Suk and Fred L. Morrison, ‘The United States’, 
in: Marie Mercat-Bruns (eds) Comparative Perspectives on 
the Enforcement and Effectiveness of Antidiscrimination Law 
(Springer 2018) 513, 513.
187 Avraham and others (n 5) 216; Suk and Morrison (n 186) 
513ff.
188 The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000ff.
189 Avraham and others (n 5) 199.
190 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
191 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
192 Cf. Croskey and others (n 67) para 706 and 710.
193 Suk and Morrison (n 186) 514.
a.) U.S. Constitution
58 Under the U.S. constitution, a common characteristic 
of a group, such as skin colour, gender, or sexual 
orientation, ought not to form the basis for unequal 
treatment. This principle is enshrined in the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution.194 Equally there are 
various other guarantees against certain types of 
discrimination found in the several Amendments of 
the U.S. Constitution.195 
59 With the exception of Part C, Medicare health care 
coverage is managed by the federal government.196 All 
governmental units are bound by the constitutional 
prohibition of discrimination. This includes those 
involved in Medicaid administration on a state level, 
such as CMS, which is responsible for review and 
approval of the state plans.197
b.) Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA)
60 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(ACA), among others, aims at guaranteeing non-
discrimination in connection with programmes 
funded under the ACA.198 Therefore, the ACA 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, colour, 
national origin, sex, age, or disability in certain 
health programmes and activities.199 The ACA also 
prohibits discriminatory premium rates for health 
insurance in the individual or small group market. 
Rating is limited to age, geographic area, individual 
or family unit, and tobacco use. 200 Only these 
listed factors may be taken into account in setting 
health insurance premiums, while the maximum 
premium variations that an insurer can charge for 
these factors are also determined by the ACA.201 For 
194 U.S. Constitution Amendment XIV. Peter J. Rubin, ‘Equal 
Rights, Special Rights, and the Nature of Antidiscrimination 
Law’ (1998) Michigan L.Rev. 97:564, 568; Avraham and 
others (n 5) 216.
195 Barbara J. Van Arsdale and others, ‘Civil Rights’, American 
Jurisprudence (2nd edn, August 2018 Update) para 3.
196 U.S. Government, Department of Health & Human Services, 
Medicare & You (2019, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services) <www.medicare.gov/Publications/>. Cf. above, 
C.III.1.a), for a general explanation of Medicare and 
Medicaid.
197 Cf. Furrow and others (n 29) 490. 
198 42 U.S.C. § 18116; Stoltzfuss Jost (n 104) para II[HH][6].
199 45 C.F.R. §§ 92.1-92.303; Robert E. Anderson and others, 
‘Insurance’, American Jurisprudence 2d (February 2019 
Update) para 544.
200 42 U.S.C. § 300gg.
201 Avraham and others (n 5) 198 Fn. 6; In terms of age, the rate 
shall not vary by more than 3 to 1 for adults (42 U.S.C. § 
300gg(a)(1)(A)(iii)). The rating factor tobacco use shall not 
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example, the factor “gender” is not on this list and 
therefore cannot be considered by health insurers.202 
Moreover, the insurers also have to consider all 
insureds of the individual and small group market 
to be members of the same risk pool.203 
61 With respect to group or individual health insurance 
coverage, the exclusion based on pre-existing 
conditions or the discrimination of those who have 
been sick in the past is also explicitly prohibited 
under the ACA.204 Hence, private health insurers must 
accept all applicants without regard to pre-existing 
conditions.205 Furthermore, group health plans must 
not discriminate against individuals based on health 
status, medical conditions, medical history, genetic 
information or the like206 or discriminate in favour 
of higher salaries.207 
62 When interpreting the ACA’s underlying race 
and sex statutes, courts have held that they 
only bar direct but not indirect discrimination. 
Nevertheless, district courts have been unwilling to 
completely dismiss the viability of indirect disability 
discrimination.208 Accordingly, it is not yet excluded 
that ACA’s anti-discrimination provision might also 
protect individuals against indirect discrimination.
c.) Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA)
63 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA) limits insurance companies’ discretion 
in considering pre-existing conditions in the 
underwriting process for group health insurance 
coverage.209 However, only some provisions of HIPAA 
are still relevant, due to fact that the ACA largely 
supersedes HIPAA.210 To give an example, HIPAA’s 
prohibition of discrimination based on health status 
in eligibility for coverage or premiums in older group 
health plans is still of relevance.211
vary by more than 1.5 to 1 (42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1)(A)(iv)), 
see above, C.III.1.c).
202 Avraham and others (n 5) 198 Fn. 6.
203 42 U.S.C. § 18032(c); see above, C.III.1.c).
204 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3.
205 DiMugno and Glad (n 104) para 37A:3.
206 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4.
207 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-16(a); see: Anderson and others (n 199) 
para 544. 
208 Cf. Briscoe v. Health Care Services Corporation, 2017 WL 5989727 
(N.D.Ill. Dec. 4 2017); Express Scripts v. Anthem ERISA Litigation, 
No. 16 Civ. 3399 (ER) 2018 WL 339946 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2018), 
appeal filed.
209 29 U.S.C. § 1181; Avraham and others (n 5) 198ff. with 
further references.
210 Furrow and others (n 29) 351.
211 Furrow and others (n 29) 351.
d.) Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA)
64 The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination 
Act (GINA) prohibits discrimination in health 
insurance coverage and employment based on 
genetic information.212 Health insurance providers 
are prohibited from requiring or requesting genetic 
information of the person insured or the individual’s 
family members and may not use such information 
for fixing rates, decisions on granting coverage or 
to infer on pre-existing conditions.213 Therefore 
denying coverage or charging different premiums to 
insureds based on genetic information is prohibited 
in group health insurance.214 But disparate impact 
claims, i.e. cases involving indirect discrimination, 
are not included in GINA.215
e.) Civil Rights Act
65 The 1964 Civil Rights Act’s Title VII216 prohibits 
employers from imposing discriminatory terms and 
conditions upon employees. If employers provide 
health care coverage for employees, discrimination 
based on various protected characteristics is 
prohibited.217 These protected characteristics are 
race, colour, religion, sex (including gender and 
pregnancy) and national origin.218 Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Acts bars both direct and indirect 
discrimination.219
f.) Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
66 People with disabilities are guaranteed the full and 
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any 
place of public accommodation. Notably, insurance 
212 29 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(3); Thomas Wm. Mayo, ‘Bioethics’, 
in: American Health Lawyers Association (ed) Health Law 
Practice Guide (December 2018 Update, Clark Boardman 
Callaghan) para 15:16. 
213 Mayo (n 212) para 15:16.
214 Avraham and others (n 5) 199; see: 29 U.S. Code § 1182; 42 
U.S.C. § 300gg-1.
215 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-7; Jennifer K. Wagner, ‘Disparate impacts 
and GINA: Congress’s unfinished business’ (2018) 5 JLB 527, 
530.
216 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
217 Croskey and others (n 67) para 706.
218 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; Tracy Bateman Farrell and others, ‘Job 
Discrimination’ American Jurisprudence (2nd edn, February 
2019 Update) para 2.
219 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; Sara Rosenbaum, ‘Insurance 
Discrimination on the Basis of Health Status: An Overview of 
Discrimination Practices, Federal Law, and Federal Reform 
Options’ (2009) 37 J.L.Med.& Ethic, 101, 108.
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offices, offices of health care providers, hospitals 
and other service establishments are, among others, 
qualified as public accommodation.220 However, it is 
not clear whether the provisions of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA) apply to insurance 
policies and the underwriting practices of insurance 
companies.221 If interpreted narrowly, insurance 
companies merely have to provide physical access to 
their service infrastructure. Such an interpretation 
would not impact the business model of an insurance 
company. By contrast, a broader interpretation 
would have a significant effect, as the respective 
provisions would apply to the goods and services 
offered by a public accommodation, meaning that 
disparate treatment of disabilities in an insurance 
policy’s provisions or an insurer’s underwriting 
decisions could be subject to scrutiny under the ADA. 
However, the literature notes that case law and the 
Justice Department’s position on this matter have 
been inconsistent.222
2. Californian Anti-discrimination Law
67 The federal laws are supplemented by Californian 
state laws, which can be administered by state 
agencies.223 Californian anti-discrimination 
regulations pertaining to the insurance business are 
found in the Constitution of California, the California 
Civil Code (CIV) and the California Insurance Code 
(INS).
a.) California Constitution
68 California’s constitutional anti-discrimination 
regulation overlaps but is not identical with the 
equal protection principle of the U.S. Constitution.224 
The U.S. Constitution permits but does not require 
the state to grant preferential treatment to suspect 
classes,225 whereas the Constitution of California 
prohibits the state from treating any individual or 
group differently in a positive or negative sense on 
the basis of race, sex, colour, ethnicity, or national 
origin in the operation of public employment, 
220 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).
221 Justice H. Walter Croskey and others, ‘Chapter 11: 
Extracontractual Liability’, California Practice Guide: Insurance 
Litigation (The Rutter Group 2017) para 351.
222 Cf. DiMugno and Glad (n 104) para 5:5; Croskey and others 
(n 221) para 351ff.
223 Suk and Morrison (n 186) 514.
224 B.E. Witkin, ‘Chapter X. Constitutional Law’ in: Summary of 
California Law (11th edn, Witkin Legal Institute 2018) para 
1088(5)(c), with further references.
225 Witkin (n 224) para 1088(5)(c) and para 1089(a); cf. Rachel M. 
Kane, ‘Public Works and Contracts’, California Jurisprudence 
3d (February 2019 Update) para 14.
public education, or public contracting.226 The 
notion of “state” includes political subdivisions 
and any department, division or sub-division of the 
state Government.227 Therefore, any governmental 
agency has to comply with the constitutional 
anti-discrimination principle. This regulation is 
particularly important for the state administration 
of Medi-Cal and the CDI. Private insurers in California 
are not bound by this principle. 
b.) California Civil Code (CIV)
69 According to the California Civil Code (CIV) all 
persons within the jurisdiction of California are 
free and equal.228 Matters of sex, race, colour, 
religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, 
medical condition, genetic information, marital 
status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary 
language, or immigration status shall not play any 
role with regard to entitlements to full and equal 
accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, 
or services in all business establishments of every 
kind whatsoever. This provision applies to property-
casualty insurances in California.229 Therefore 
the aforementioned characteristics must not be 
considered when calculating automobile or renters 
insurance premiums.
c.) California Insurance Code (INS)
70 In Californian insurance law, discrimination on 
grounds of specific protected classes is prohibited.230 
By law, Californian insurance companies are 
prohibited from denying insurance coverage 
based on sex, marital status, race, ancestry, 
colour, religion, national origin, disability, medical 
condition, physical or mental impairment, genetic 
characteristics or sexual orientation.231 The 
California Insurance Code (INS) expressly bars health 
insurers from discriminating on the basis of these 
226 Cal. Const., art. I, § 31(a)); Kane (n 225) para 14.
227 Witkin (n 224) para 1088(1).
228 § 51(b) CIV.
229 INS §§ 679.70 and 679.71 as well as 1861.03(a); DiMugno and 
Glad (n 104) para 66:18.
230 Kristina Alexander and others ‘Issuance of Insurance 
Policies’, in: Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP and Kristina 
Alexander (eds) California Insurance Law & Practice 
(Matthew Bender 2018) para 9.08[2][b].
231 Cf. INS § 679.71 for renters insurance, INS §§ 11628-11629.5 
for automobile liability insurance, INS § 10140 for health 
insurance, NS §§ 10192.11(a)(1), 10192.11(h)(1), 10192.12(a)
(2) and 10192.24(a). for Medicare supplement insurance and 
10 CCR § 2560.3 which applies to all classes of insurance. 
Kristina Alexander and others (n 230) para 9.08[2][b].
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characteristics.232 Considering sexual orientation 
as an underwriting criteria or using it to determine 
whether to require an HIV-test is also prohibited. 
Even if insurers were to infer sexual orientation from 
marital status, living arrangements, occupation, 
sex, beneficiary designation, ZIP Codes or other 
territorial classification, this would qualify as an 
unlawful discrimination.233 However, charging 
differing health insurance premiums for different 
sexes is allowed if it is based on objective, valid, and 
up-to-date statistical and actuarial data or sound 
underwriting practices.234 Furthermore, adjusting 
health insurance rates for the same coverage, 
solely because of a physical or mental impairment, 
is prohibited unless the differentiation is based on 
sound actuarial principles or is related to actual and 
reasonably anticipated experience.235
71 For property-casualty insurances, Proposition 103 
prohibits unfairly discriminatory insurance rates.236 
But there are no rules that specify how the “unfairly 
discriminatory” nature of rates shall be determined, 
since this concept is neither defined in the INS, nor 
in other regulations.237 Therefore the CDI must make 
a case-by-case assessment.238 Rates are deemed 
unfairly discriminatory whenever price differentials 
fail to reflect the difference in expected losses and 
expenses in an equitable manner.239
IV. Findings
72 In Switzerland, the prohibitions of discrimination 
in the Federal Constitution and various statutes 
set certain limits to the individualisation of 
insurance contracts. Also, insurance companies 
are barred from utilising pre-symptomatic or 
pre-natal genetic tests in their underwriting 
procedures. Other forms of discrimination could 
be present if the individualisation is based on 
protected characteristics – such as age, gender 
or origin – and the differentiation cannot be 
justified on objective grounds. However, insurance 
companies individualise their conditions primarily 
according to the risk profile of the insured, and 
sometimes according to their willingness to pay. 
232 INS §§ 10140, 10143 and 10144.
233 INS § 10140(e).
234 INS § 10140(a). 
235 INS § 10144.
236 See above, C.III.2.
237 De La Mora and Kook (n 116) para 6A.04(2), (4).
238 De La Mora and Kook (n 116) para 6A.04(2)-(4).
239 INS § 11732.5. In its assessments of rates, rating plans, and 
rating factors, the CDI applies a definition of “unfairly 
discriminatory” which was originally laid down in the law 
for workers compensation rates (De La Mora and Kook 
(n 116) para 6A.04(4).
These factors do not usually align with protected 
characteristics. If they do so (as in the case of 
gender), insurance companies should be able to 
justify the individualisation on a regular basis as 
it will be based on objective reasons (e.g. higher 
risks of male drivers) and most often on actuarially 
sound criteria such as a different risk profile. Thus, 
there are hardly any relevant restrictions to the 
individualisation of insurance contracts arising from 
the general prohibition of discrimination.
73 In contrast to Swiss law, U.S. and Californian law 
provide strong and extensive protection against 
discrimination. These provisions are also applicable 
in horizontal relationships, i.e. they also govern 
contractual relationships between individuals and 
businesses. Californian insurance law prohibits 
discrimination and the use of certain protected 
characteristics for the insurer’s risk classification. 
This regulation is in line with federal law, which 
prohibits discrimination in many sectoral laws 
for specific areas of insurance. Accordingly, the 
individualisation of insurance contracts must not 
be based on protected characteristics, further 
restricting the leeway for the individualisation of 
insurance contracts, which is already severely limited 
by insurance law. However, anti-discrimination law 
only rules out individualisation based on protected 
characteristics, thereby leaving (very limited) room 
for an individualisation based on other features.
E. Data Protection Law
I. Preliminary Remarks
74 For the individualisation of insurance contracts, 
insurers rely on data on their current or potential 
policyholders. The sources from which this data can 
be obtained are very diverse. Insurers have always 
demanded pre-contractual disclosure of information 
directly from the potential policyholder. But with the 
possibilities offered by new technologies, they can 
now increasingly rely on data collected during the 
term of the insurance contract (e.g. by using tracking 
tools) and on data bought from third parties, such as 
providers of social networking sites or apps.
75 The data analysed for the individualisation of 
insurance contracts will always be personal data 
and hence raise questions with regard to privacy 
and data protection law. The European approach 
to informational privacy has been and still is all-
encompassing. European data protection laws apply 
to any processing of personal data in the public and 
the private sector,240 thereby trying to establish 
240 Art. 2 para 1 GDPR; Art. 2 para 1 DPA.
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rules and safeguards for all means and aims of 
processing personal data. The U.S. does not enact 
such all-encompassing data protection regulations, 
but rather pursues a sector-specific approach to 
safeguard informational privacy.241
76 In the past years, the data protection landscape has 
undergone significant changes, in particular due to 
the EU enacting the GDPR.242 Switzerland is not an 
EU member state and under no formal obligation 
to implement the GDPR. However, Switzerland is 
a signee of the Council of Europe Convention 108 
and when modernising the Convention 108 
(Convention 108+) the Council of Europe ensured 
consistency with the GDPR.243 Since Switzerland 
aims at signing the Convention 108+, it is set to 
adapt rules that align with the standard of the 
GDPR.244 Furthermore, the GDPR claims to apply 
to processing activities outside of EU territory and 
hence businesses in Switzerland are often advised to 
ensure compliance with the GDPR. For these reasons, 
we will not limit the analysis of data protection law 
to the Swiss Data Protection Act (DPA),245 but also 
include the GDPR.
77 The principles applied to the processing of personal 
data in Switzerland and the EU are only marginally 
different. However, there is one important (but often 
neglected) difference with regard to the regulatory 
approach: Under the GDPR every processing of 
personal data must have a lawful basis, such as 
consent of the data subject246 or a legitimate interest 
of the controller;247 in addition, the processing must 
be carried out in accordance with the applicable 
data protection principles.248 In Switzerland, the 
processing of personal data is lawful if the data 
protection principles are respected and a lawful 
basis is only required if the handling of personal data 
241 Lothar Determann, ‘Adequacy of data protection in the USA: 
myths and facts’ (2016) 6 IDPL, 244, 246. 
242 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ 2016 
L 119/1.
243 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Protocol amending 
the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Council of Europe, 2018) 
Treaty Series - No. 223, 1.
244 Swiss Federal Council, Botschaft zum Bundesgesetz über die 
Totalrevision des Bundesgesetzes über den Datenschutz und die 
Änderung weiterer Erlasse zum Datenschutz vom 15. September 
2017 (BBl 2017) 6941, 6969ff.
245 Bundesgesetz über den Datenschutz vom 19. Juni 1992, 
SR 235.1.
246 Art. 6 para 1. lit. a GDPR.
247 Art. 6 para 1 lit. f GDPR.
248 Art. 5 GDPR.
is infringing these principles.249
II. Switzerland & the 
European Union
78 In Europe, data protection law is historically rooted 
in the right to respect for one’s private and family 
life, his home and his correspondence.250 The 1981 
Council of Europe Convention for the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data (Convention 108) established harmonised rules 
for electronic data processing. Nowadays, the right 
to data protection enjoys the status of a fundamental 
right in the EU251 and, according to the predominant 
doctrine in Switzerland, the (fundamental) right to 
informational self-determination can be derived from 
the Swiss Federal Constitution.252 The fundamental 
rights approach has led to European lawmakers 
enacting all-encompassing data protection laws, 
which apply to any handling of data relating to an 
identified or identifiable person.253
1. Data protection principles
79 European data protection laws set forth conditions for 
every processing of data that relates to an identified 
or identifiable person (personal data).254 The notion of 
“processing” encompasses any handling of personal 
data one can think of.255 Whoever, alone or jointly 
with others, determines the purposes and means 
of the processing of personal data is a “controller” 
and, among others, has to ensure being compliant 
with the principles relating to the processing of 
249 Art. 12 para 2 lit. a DPA.
250 Art. 8 ECHR.
251 Art. 13 FC and Art. 8 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union [2012] OJ C326/02.
252 Swiss Federal Court (BGE 138 II 346) [2012] at 8.2; Rainer J. 
Schweizer, ‘Art. 13 BV‘ in: Bernhard Ehrenzeller and others 
(eds) Die Schweizerische Bundesverfassung: St. Galler Kommentar 
(Dike and Schulthess 2014) para 72; David Rosenthal, 
‘Art. 1 DSG‘ in: David Rosenthal and Yvonne Jhöri (eds) 
Handkommentar zum Datenschutzgesetz (Schulthess 2008) 
para 3ff. Critical: Eva Maria Belser, ‘Zur rechtlichen Tragweite 
des Grundrechts auf Datenschutz: Missbrauchsschutz 
oder Schutz der informationellen Selbstbestimmung?‘, in: 
Astrid Epiney and others (eds) Instrumente zur Umsetzung 
des Rechts auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung/Instruments de 
mise en oeuvre du droit à l’autodétermination informationnelle 
(Schulthess 2013) 19.
253 Cf. Chris Jay Hoofnagle and others, ‘The European Union 
general data protection regulation: what it is and what it 
means’ (2019) 28 Info.&Comm.Tech.L., 65, 72ff.
254 Insurance companies have access to a variety of data sets 
and since the data can often be linked to individuals, it will 
qualify as personal data (cf. Weber (n 1) para 6).
255 Hoofnagle and others (n 253) 72ff.
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personal data.256 These principles are deemed the 
core of European data protection law.257 As a general 
rule, every processing of personal data has to comply 
with all the data protection principles.258
80 Regarding the individualisation of insurance 
contracts based on big data analytics, the principles 
of purpose limitation,259 data minimisation and 
storage limitation are of particular relevance.260 
Furthermore, questions with regard to the principles 
of fairness (translated as good faith in Switzerland) 
and transparency of processing arise.261 Lastly, data 
quality can play a role in any data analysis.262
a.) Transparency and Purpose Limitation
81 The principle of transparency obliges controllers 
to be transparent with regard to their processing 
operations.263 This principle is closely connected to 
the principle of purpose limitation as it requires the 
controller to provide information on the purpose 
of its processing.264 The transparency of data 
processing is arguably not only the single most 
256 Cf. Art. 5 para 2 GDPR; Switzerland currently employs 
a different terminology, yet it is expected that this will 
change.
257 Cf. Peter Hustinx, ‘EU Data Protection Law: The Review 
of Directive 95/ 46/ EC and the General Data Protection 
Regulation’ in: Marise Cremona (ed) New Technologies and EU 
Law (OUP 2017) 127 and 131.
258 Art. 5 GDPR; Art. 4 and 5 DPA. Peter Carey, ‘Data Protection 
Principles’ in: Peter Carey (ed) Data Protection: A Practical 
Guide to UK and EU Law (5th edn, OUP 2018) 32, 32.
259 Art. 5 para 1 GDPR; Art. 4 para 3 DPA.
260 Art. 5 para 1 lit. c and e GDPR; in Switzerland data 
minimisation and storage limitation are derived from the 
general principle of proportionality enshrined in Art. 4 
para 2 DPA. Cf. Weber (Fn. 52) 101; Rolf H. Weber, ‘Big 
Data: Rechtliche Perspektive‘ in: Rolf H. Weber and Florent 
Thouvenin (eds) Big Data und Datenschutz – Gegenseitige 
Herausforderungen (Schulthess 2014) 17; Philippe Meier, 
Protection des données (Stämpfli Verlag 2011) para 673; 
Yvonne Prieur, ‘Datenschutz und «Big Data-Geschäfte» 
auf dem Prüfstand‘ (2015) Allgemeine Juristische Praxis, 
1643, 1649; Bruno Baeriswyl, ‚Art. 4 DSG‘, in: Bruno 
Baeriswyl und Kurt Pärli (eds) Stämpflis Handkommentar 
Datenschutzgesetz (Stämpfli Verlag 2015) para 23; Florent 
Thouvenin, ‚Forschung im Spannungsfeld von Big Data und 
Datenschutzrecht: eine Problemskizze‘ in: Volker Boehme-
Nessler and Manfred Rehbinder (eds) Big Data: Ende des 
Datenschutzes? Gedächtnisschrift für Matin Usteri, (Stämpfli 
Verlag 2017) 27, 34.
261 Art. 5 para 1 lit. a GDPR; Art. 4 para 2 and para 4 DPA.
262 Art. 5 para 1 lit. d GDPR; Art. 5 DPA.
263 Art. 5 para 1 lit. a GDPR; Art. 4 para 4 DPA.
264 Art. 13 para 1 lit. c and Art. 14 para 1 lit. c GDPR; 
Florent Thouvenin, ‘Erkennbarkeit und Zweckbindung: 
Grundprinzipien des Datenschutzrechts auf dem Prüfstand 
von Big Data’, in: Rolf H. Weber and Florent Thouvenin (eds) 
Big Data und Datenschutz – Gegenseitige Herausforderungen 
(Schulthess 2014) 61, 64.
important principle of data protection law, but also 
the reason for the broad information duties of data 
controllers265 and the right of access.266
82 The principle of purpose limitation is a key principle 
of data protection law and consists of two aspects: 
first, the purposes for which the controller intends 
to process the data need to be specified (purpose 
specification); and second, these purposes set the 
limits for the controller’s processing operations (use 
limitation).267 The purposes have to be clearly and 
unambiguously specified pursuant to the GDPR and 
a controller’s processing operations are limited to 
what is compatible with these specified purposes. 
Swiss law allows processing for purposes that are 
specified or merely obvious due to the circumstances 
of the collection of the data. But in turn, a controller’s 
operations are strictly limited to these purposes.268
83 In order to meet the requirements of transparency 
and purpose specification, insurance companies 
must ensure that their customers are aware of 
the fact that their personal data is processed for 
providing an individual offer, taking into account 
their personal risk profile and/or their willingness 
to pay. This should not cause particular problems 
with regard to data obtained directly from the 
(potential) policyholder in the context of a specific 
insurance contract. But insurance companies may 
want to use data that has not been obtained for the 
purpose of running big data analytics to calculate 
individual premiums, e.g. data on treatments and 
therapies collected for billing and reimbursement 
purposes. Such use would have to be classified as 
data repurposing269 and would trigger the insurance 
companies’ duty to inform the data subject 
accordingly. While informing their customers 
about such repurposing should not be a problem, it 
might be difficult or even impossible for insurance 
companies to comply with this requirement if their 
analysis includes data about individuals who are not 
their customers. As in other cases, the principle of 
transparency and purpose limitation appear to be in 
a fundamental conflict with big data analytics’ idea 
of gaining new insights from existing data.270
265 Art. 13ff. GDPR; Art. 14 and Art. 18a DPA.
266 Art. 15 GDPR; Art. 8 DPA.
267   Art. 5 para 1 lit. b GDPR; Art. 4 para 3 DPA; Carey (n 258) 
34; Bart Custers and Helena Uršič ‘Big Data and data reuse: 
a taxonomy of data reuse for balancing big data benefits 
and personal data protection’ (2016) 6 IDPL, 4, 8; Thouvenin 
(n 264) 67.
268 Thouvenin (n 264) 67ff.
269 Custers and Uršič (n 267) 8.
270 Thouvenin (n 264), passim; cf. Paul MacDonnell, ‘The 
European Union’s Proposed Equality and Data Protection 
Rules: An Existential Problem for Insurers?’ (2015) 35 
Ec.Aff., 225, 233, stating that insurance companies using 
data mining techniques do not know what they will find 
until it is too late.
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b.) Data Minimisation and 
Storage Limitation
84 According to the data minimisation principle, as few 
data as necessary, for the purposes of the processing 
shall be processed.271 Similarly, the principle of 
storage limitation’s objective is to ensure that 
controllers do not keep data longer than necessary 
for the initial purpose of the processing.272 Thus, as 
few data as needed for the purposes specified at the 
initial collection shall be processed and as soon as 
the initial purpose of the collection is fulfilled, the 
personal data has to be deleted. As seen already, 
it is arguably impossible to be specific about the 
purposes of big data analysis. Since the data would 
have to be deleted as soon as the initial purpose is 
fulfilled, data reuse would be generally impossible 
according to these principles. Thus, if interpreted 
strictly, the data minimisation and storage limitation 
principles go head to head with big data analytics 
and many other data processing practices, since 
the data would have to be deleted and be lost for 
future analysis.273 These challenges also affect the 
processing of personal data by insurance companies. 
Namely, the principles of data minimisation and 
storage limitation may have a negative impact on 
the accuracy of the data analysis carried out to 
determine individual risk profiles and willingness 
to pay, but they do not hinder the individualisation 
of insurance contracts as such.
c.) Data Quality
85 An important aspect of any data analysis is data 
quality. Data protection laws in Switzerland and the 
EU incorporate a data accuracy principle, according 
to which personal data must be accurate and, where 
necessary, kept up to date.274 The principle intends 
to prevent decisions made on the basis of poor 
data. However, the controller should only alter 
and update data when it is necessary to mitigate 
potential dangers to the fundamental rights of the 
data subjects.275 Whenever this danger cannot be 
271 Art. 5 para 1 lit. c GDPR; Art. 4 para 2 DPA, where the 
principle of data minimisation is derived from the more 
general principle of proportionality; see Thouvenin (n 63) 
31.
272 Art. 5 para 1 lit. e GDPR; Art. 4 para 2 DPA, where the principle 
of storage limitation is derived from the more general 
principle of proportionality; see Thouvenin (n 63) 31; for 
an EU perspective see also Tjimen H.A. Wjisman, ‘Privacy, 
Data Protection and E-Commerce’, in: Arno R. Lodder and 
Andrew D. Murray (eds) EU Regulation of E-Commerce: A 
Commentary (Edward Elgar 2017) point 12.13.
273 MacDonnell (n 270) 233; Hoofnagle and others (n 253) 78.
274 Art. 5 para 1 lit. d GDPR; Art. 5 DPA.
275 Cf. Thomas Hoeren ‚Big Data und die Datenqualität – ein 
Blick auf die DSGVO‘(2016) 6 ZD, 459, 461ff.
identified, there is no need to “correct” or update 
the data. While ensuring data quality might be as 
difficult for insurance companies as for other data 
controllers, this principle does not hinder the 
individualisation of insurance contracts.
d.) Fairness and Good Faith
86 The principle of fairness or good faith276 has a 
catch-all function.277 It is understood as a duty to 
safeguard the interests of the data subject in good 
faith and not to interfere unnecessarily with his 
protected interests. Clandestine data processing as 
well as data processing which the data subject did 
not need to expect, often conflict with the principle 
of good faith.278 Even though the principle of good 
faith might be affected in many constellations, its 
importance should not be overestimated. Scholars 
rightly argue that it should only be used restrictively 
to correct disturbing results that would otherwise be 
in accordance with the law.279 Thus, the principle also 
has little steering effect regarding the interpretation 
of legal norms.280 In particular, good faith should not 
be equated with an obligation to equal treatment or a 
general prohibition of differential treatment. Rather 
these prohibitions need to be specified in statutes.281 
Hence the principle of good faith does not hinder 
individualisation of insurance contracts.
2. Lawful basis
87 In the EU, data processing must always be based on 
(at least) one of six reasons for the lawfulness of 
processing.282 In Switzerland, such reasons are only 
needed if the principles relating to the processing of 
personal data are violated.283
276 Art. 5 para 1 lit. a GDPR; Art. 4 para 2 DPA.
277 Lee A. Bygrave, Data Privacy Law (OUP 2014) 146; Tobias 
Herbst, ‘Art. 5 DS-GVO’ in: Jürgen Kühling and Benedikt 
Buchner (eds) Datenschutz-Grundverordnung/BDSG (2nd edn, 
C.H. Beck 2018) para 17; David Rosenthal, ‘Art. 4 DSG’ in: 
David Rosenthal and Yvonne Jhöri (eds) Handkommentar zum 
Datenschutzgesetz (Schulthess 2008) para 14.
278 Aurelia Tamò-Larrieux, Designing for Privacy and its Legal 
Framework (Springer 2018) 88; Baeriswyl (n 260) para 19.
279 Thouvenin (n 63) 34; Herbst (n 277) para 17; Philipp 
Reimer, ‘Art. 5 DSGVO’ in: Gernot Sydow (ed) Europäische 
Datenschutzgrundverordnung (2nd edn, Nomos, Manz and 
Dike 2018) para 14; Alexander Roßnagel, ‘Art. 5 DSGVO’ in: 
Simitis and others (eds) Datenschutzrecht: DSGVO mit BDSG 
(Nomos 2019) para 47.
280 Roßnagel (n 279) para 48.
281 Thouvenin (n 63) 35.
282 Art. 6 GDPR.
283 Thouvenin (n 63) 36.
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a.) Consent
88 Most often, the data subject’s consent serves 
as a legal basis.284 Consent must be freely and 
unambiguously given after adequate information on 
specified purposes of the processing operation.285 
Notably, consent to processing may be withdrawn 
by data subjects at any time without having to 
specify any reasons.286 While this makes it difficult 
for controllers to rely on consent, the processing on 
other lawful bases remains possible.
89 Swiss and EU law contain hardly any formal 
requirements regarding consent. Neither law 
requires it to be given in writing. However, since 
a controller has the burden of proof when relying 
on consent for processing, he or she is advised to 
obtain consent in writing or another documentable 
form.287 Unambiguous consent means that insurance 
companies may not rely on opt-out mechanisms, but 
actually require their customers to opt-in to the 
processing of their personal data.288
90 Regarding substantive requirements, the 
requirement of freely given consent is the one 
that limits controllers the most. In this context 
so-called bundling, i.e. making the performance 
of a contract conditional upon consent to the 
processing of personal data that is not necessary 
for the performance of that contract, is discussed 
controversially.289 Some scholars argue that take-it-
or-leave it choices do not qualify as a freely given 
consent.290 However, one may also take the view 
that whenever providing personal data is part of 
the data’s subject’s main obligation, such processing 
is necessary and not prohibited by data protection 
law.291
284 Art. 13 para 1 DPA; Art. 6 para 1 lit. a GDPR.
285 Cf. Art. 4 para 11 GDPR and Art. 6 para 1 lit. a GDPR ; Art. 4 
para 4 DPA. Corrado Rampini, ‘Art. 13 DSG’ in: Urs Maurer-
Lambrou and Gabor P. Blechta (eds) Basler Kommentar 
Datenschutzgesetz, Öffentlichkeitsgesetz (3rd edn, Helbing 
Lichtenhahn 2014) para 3ff.
286 Art. 7 para 3 GDPR. Rampini (n 285) para 14.
287 Tobias Fasnacht, Die Einwilligung im Datenschutzrecht 
(Freiburg: Universitätsverlag 2017), Rn. 250 f.; Benedikt 
Buchner and Jürgen Kühling, ‚Art. 7 DS-GVO‘ in: Jürgen 
Kühling and Benedikt Buchner (eds) Datenschutz-
Grundverordnung/BDSG (2nd edn, C.H. Beck 2018), para 27. 
Notably, the GDPR states that if consent is obtained in 
the context of a written declaration, it must be clearly 
distinguished from other matters, using clear and plain 
language (Art. 7 para 2 GDPR).
288 Hoofnagle and others (n 253) 79.
289 Art. 7 para 4 GDPR. For Switzerland cf. Rampini (n 285) 
para 8.
290 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Guidelines on consent under 
Regulation 2016/679’ (WP 259 rev.01, 28. November 2017) 
at 9ff.
291 Cf. C-673/17, Planet 49, Opinion of Advocate Szpunar [2019] 
(ECLI:EU:C:2019:246) at 99. As different notions of freedom 
91 With regard to insurance contracts, providing 
information that enables assessing risks in 
underwriting procedures is part of the insured’s 
main obligation. The same can be said for data 
collected during the term of the contract. While 
data on the insured’s behaviour related to the risks 
which are covered by the insurance contract may 
not be strictly necessary for the performance of the 
contract, this data is so closely linked to the insurance 
contract that requesting consent to collecting such 
data can hardly be qualified as bundling. The same 
is true for data on the data subject’s willingness 
to pay. While there is no direct connection to the 
performance of the contract, such data is used to 
provide an individualised offer for entering into a 
specific contract and is thus so closely related to the 
contract that requesting consent for the processing 
of such data cannot be qualified as bundling. There 
might be bundling and no freely given consent, 
however, if the insurance company requests consent 
for collecting of data which is neither related to the 
risks covered by the insurance contract, nor to the 
insured’s ability or willingness to pay.
92 Since consent is only valid with regard to the specific 
purpose for which it was given, controllers need 
to get renewed consent if they want to process 
personal data for other purposes than the one it 
had been collected for.292 As mentioned above,293 
this emanation of the principle of purpose limitation 
goes head to head with the idea of big data analytics 
to analyse data for other purposes than the ones 
initially intended. However, the limitation is not 
strict. While the GDPR allows the processing for 
compatible purposes, the DPA allows processing for 
purposes that were indicated by the controller or 
obvious from the circumstances.294 While it remains 
unclear what purposes would qualify as “obvious” 
under Swiss law, the GDPR states which criteria must 
be taken into account to assess the compatibility of 
a new purpose.295 As the repurposing of data does 
not always need consent, the controller may use the 
data for big data analytics as far as the new purpose 
is compatible with the one for which the data was 
collected for.
93 The purposes for which insurance companies use 
personal data will most often be closely connected 
– at least as long as the data is used in the realm of 
one specific insurance contract; e.g. the processing 
of personal data to decide on whether the insurance 
company has to pay for an insured event (e.g. a car 
could be applied in practice, it is to be seen from enforcement 
what courts deem acceptable “freedom” (Hoofnagle and 
others (n 253) 80).
292 Custers and Uršič (n 267) 8.
293 See above, E.II.1.a).
294 Art. 5 para 1 (b) and Art. 6 para 4 GDPR; Art. 4 para 3 DPA.
295 Cf. Art. 6 para 4 GDPR.
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accident) and the use of such data for estimating 
the insured’s (future) risk (e.g. his or her driving 
behaviour) are closely connected and these purposes 
should therefore be considered compatible. In 
addition, the data would remain in the controller-
data subject relationship, so that the latter has a 
reasonable expectation of an insurance company 
using data on an insured event to amend and alter 
the terms of this relationship. Such forms of re-
use would therefore not trigger the need to get 
renewed consent. It would be different, however, 
if data collected in connection with one contract 
(e.g. automobile insurance) is used for assessing the 
risks covered by a different contract (e.g. health 
insurance). In these cases, the insurance company 
would need to get the data subject’s specific consent.
b.) Performance of a contract
94 Processing is lawful if it is necessary for the 
performance of a contract that the data subject is 
a party to, or to take steps to enter into a contract 
that the data subject has requested.296 “Necessity” 
means that the purpose of the processing could 
not be fulfilled with anonymous information.297 
If the data is merely useful, this lawful basis shall 
not apply.298 Controversially, the European Data 
Protection Board (EDPB) stated that only objectively 
necessary processing operations may be based 
on this legal ground and the contract cannot 
“artificially expand” the categories of personal data 
or processing operations beyond the data subject’s 
reasonable expectations.299 However, other scholars 
highlight that data may be processed if the purpose 
of the contract cannot “reasonably” be fulfilled by 
other means. Thus, they argue against a restrictive 
understanding of necessity and state that reducing 
costs and fostering efficiency are reasonable and 
hence necessary aspects of performing a contract.300
296 Art. 6 para 1 lit. b GDPR; Art. 13 para 2 (a) DPA.
297 Cf. C-524/06, Huber [2008] (ECLI:EU:C:2008:724) at 62ff; 
Estelle Dehon and Peter Carey ‘Fair, Lawful and Transparent 
Processing’, in: Peter Carey (ed) Data Protection: A Practical 
Guide to UK and EU Law (5th edn, OUP 2018), 42, 50.
298 Horst Heberlein, ‘Art. 6 DS-GVO’ in: Eugen Ehmann 
and Martin Selmayr (eds) DS-GVO: Kommentar, (2nd edn, 
C.H.Beck and LexisNexis 2018), para 13; Benedikt Buchner 
and Thomas Petri, ‘Art. 6 DS-GVO’ in: Jürgen Kühling and 
Benedikt Buchner (eds) Datenschutz-Grundverordnung/BDSG 
(2nd edn, C.H. Beck 2018), para 15.
299 European Data Protection Board, ‘Guidelines 2/2019 on 
the processing of personal data under Article 6(1)(b) GDPR 
in the context of the provision of online services to data 
subjects, version for public consultation’ (EDPB, 9 April 
2019) at 8ff.
300 These scholars reference GDPR, recital 39. Cf. Kai-Uwe 
Plath, ‘Art. 6 DSGVO’ in: Kai-Uwe Plath (ed) DSGVO/BDSG: 
Kommentar (3rd edn, Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt 2018) para 20ff; 
Dehon and Carey (n 297) 55. Cf. Sebastian Schulz, ‘Art. 6 DS-
95 Certainly, insurers need comprehensive, granular 
and accurate data in order to assess the data subject’s 
risks accurately. Thus, on the one hand it could be 
argued that the processing of any data facilitating 
the risk analysis is objectively necessary for the 
performance of the contract. On the other hand, 
business transactions can be performed in situations 
of uncertainty and such uncertainty is the very 
reason customers are willing to conclude insurance 
contracts. An insurer, it could therefore be argued, 
initially bears the risk of imperfect information and 
performing data analysis in order to reduce that risk 
with regard to individual customers could be deemed 
“unreasonable”, since the insurer can always rely 
on risk groups and does not necessarily have to 
individualise insurance contracts. As establishing 
the necessity of processing for a contractual 
obligation comes with considerable uncertainties, 
controllers are advised to rely on other grounds for 
the lawfulness of processing.301
c.) Legitimate interests
96 In Switzerland and the EU, data processing can be 
based on an interest analysis.302 Despite explicit 
interest analysis being regarded as a tool that would 
allow a judge to do the specific case justice,303 in 
practice it is the controller who has to perform this 
balancing exercise.304 In this interest analysis, the 
legitimate interests pursued by the controller are at 
the heart of the reasoning. But the interests of a third 
party may be taken into account as well.305 These 
interests have to be legitimate, meaning that they 
shall be in accordance with the law in the broadest 
sense.306 The controller’s or a third party’s interests 
GVO‘ in: Peter Gola (eds) Datenschutz-Grundverordnung: DS-
GVO, VO (EU) 2016/679: Kommentar (2nd edn, C.H. Beck 2018) 
para 38.
301 Hoofnagle and others (n 253) 80.
302 Art. 13 para 1 DPA; Art. 6 para 1 lit. f GDPR. Cf. above, E.I for 
the systematic differences between the two approaches.
303 Swiss Federal Council, Botschaft zum Bundesgesetz über den 
Datenschutz (DSG) vom 23. März 1988 (BBl 1988) vol II, 413, 460.
304 Cf. Andreas Sattler, ‘From Personality to Property: 
Revisiting the Fundamentals of the Protection of Personal 
Data’, in: Mor Bakhoum and others (eds) Personal Data in 
Competition, Consumer Protection and Intellectual Property Law 
Towards a Holistic Approach? (Springer 2018) MPI Studies on 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law, vol. 28, 27, 36.
305 Irene Kamara and Paul de Hert, ‘Balancing and the 
Controller’s Legitimate Interest’ in: Evan Selinger and 
others (eds) The Cambridge Handbook of Consumer Privacy 
(CUP 2018) 331; Dehon and Carey (n 297) 58; Constantin 
Herfurth, ‘Interessenabwägung nach Art. 6 Abs. 1 lit. f DS-
GVO’ (2018) 8 ZD, 5144; David Rosenthal, ‘Art. 13 DSG’ in: 
David Rosenthal and Yvonne Jhöri (eds) Handkommentar zum 
Datenschutzgesetz (Schulthess 2008) para 7; Rampini (n 285) 
para 21.
306 Herfurth (n 305) 514; Paolo Balboni and others, ‘Legitimate 
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have to be balanced against the interests of the data 
subject. In a first step, the necessity of the processing 
in question has to be ascertained. In the literature, 
necessity is usually defined negatively, meaning one 
has to ask whether it would be possible to pursue the 
legitimate interests in a less interfering manner with 
the data subject’s right to data protection.307 Once it 
has been established that the legitimate interest in 
question cannot be fulfilled by less-invasive means, 
the interests have to be balanced against in a second 
step.
97 Insurers have an interest in collecting and processing 
comprehensive, granular and accurate data on the 
insured’s characteristics and behaviour related to 
the risks covered by the insurance contract and on 
their ability and willingness to pay. As this interest 
is backed by the controller’s fundamental freedom 
to conduct business308 and since it may be assumed 
that neither Switzerland nor the EU member states 
prohibit the processing of data for these purposes, 
the interest of the controller in having access to that 
data can be considered legitimate.
98 While many scholars and data protection authorities 
(implicitly) base the pondering of interests on the 
assumption that data subjects have a general interest 
in not having their data collected and processed, a 
person seeking out insurance may actually have 
an interest in the processing of his or her personal 
data for the purpose of individualisation as they may 
get a better offer if their risk profile and/or their 
willingness to pay is below average. Therefore, the 
balancing of interests must be nuanced: On the one 
hand, the portion of policyholders whose individual 
risks are smaller than the average risk of the group 
they would be part of actually benefits from the data 
processing. Their personalised premiums should 
be lower than the premiums they would have to 
pay when classified in a risk group. On the other 
hand, policyholders whose risks are higher than 
the average risk of their group have no interests in 
a personalised risk profile and insurance contract. 
Furthermore, persons who are not part of the data-
controller-data-subject relationship would benefit 
from another individual’s data being analysed as 
long as the analysed individual has a higher risk 
than they do. The more high-risk individuals pay 
individualised premiums, the more likely it is that 
the low risk individuals pay lower premiums and 
eventually benefit from the data processing. The 
same argument applies to the willingness to pay.
interest of the data controller New data protection 
paradigm: legitimacy grounded on appropriate protection’ 
(2013) 3 IDPL, 244, 254; Dehon and Carey (n 297) 57; Rampini 
(n 285) para 22.
307 Kamara and de Hert (n 305) 332.
308 Art. 16 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; Art. 26 Swiss 
Federal Constitution.
99 Following this train of thought leads to a situation 
where the interests of individuals that would pay more 
due to individualisation outweigh the controller’s 
legitimate interests in analysing the data, whereas 
the processing of data relating to policyholders that 
are better off with individualised premiums could be 
justified with the legitimate interests of the controller 
and the concurring interests of these data subjects. 
Such an interpretation, however, cannot solve the 
issue at stake and must be rejected for two reasons: 
First, it merely focuses on an analysis of the potential 
advantages or disadvantages of the data processing 
and does not take into account the general interest 
of (some) data subjects in not having their data 
analysed, irrespective of the effect of such analysis. 
Second – and this is the crucial point – in order 
to determine whether a (potential) policyholder 
actually benefits from the analysis of his or her data, 
the policyholder’s data would have to be analysed. 
Hence an a priori differentiation between “winners” 
and “losers” is impossible, and the lawfulness of the 
processing can thus only be determined after the 
data has already been processed. As a consequence, 
the lawfulness of processing of personal data for the 
individualisation of insurance contracts cannot be 
based on such a pondering of interests.
100 As mentioned above, public interests should be 
taken into consideration as well309 – and in this case 
they could actually help to solve the dilemma. From 
this perspective, the individualisation of insurance 
contracts based on the processing of personal data 
is a meaningful way to help solve the problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard.310 Since the 
processing of personal data allows for the offering 
of individual premiums, insurance companies should 
now be able to also attract policyholders with a low 
risk profile, thereby gaining additional customers 
and making insurance coverage attractive to low 
risk individuals as well. This would help tackle the 
problem of adverse selection much better than 
the mere sorting of policyholders into different 
risk groups. The problem of moral hazard could 
be significantly mitigated if the collection and 
processing of personal data gathered after the 
conclusion of the insurance contract (e.g. by using 
driving or fitness trackers) is considered legitimate, 
since the risk of having to pay higher premiums due 
to risky behaviour would provide powerful incentives 
to policyholders to behave more carefully.311 Finally, 
from a public policy perspective, it is hard to dispute 
the fact that the individualisation of insurance 
premiums has positive effects on the economy as 
a whole.312
309 Herfurth (n 305) 515.
310 See above, B.I.
311 See above, B.I.
312 See above, B.II.
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101 In sum, there are good arguments for an overriding 
legitimate interest of the insurance companies 
which would ensure the lawfulness of processing of 
the insured’s personal data. Nevertheless, since the 
balancing of interest analysis requires a case-specific 
assessment, it may be argued that a universal interest 
analysis is impossible. After all, an interest analysis 
should do justice to specific cases. As a consequence, 
insurance companies would run a considerable risk 
if they base the lawfulness of processing on their 
legitimate interests alone.
3. Special Categories of Data
102 In Switzerland, special categories of data enjoy 
additional protection as this data relates to the data 
subject’s personality in a particularly sensitive way.313 
Such sensitivity is given if data relates to religious, 
ideological, political or trade union-related views or 
activities, health, the intimate sphere or the racial 
origin, social security measures, administrative or 
criminal proceedings, and sanctions.314 However, 
the DPA does not prohibit the processing of such 
data per se. The aforementioned general conditions 
for lawfulness apply to special categories of data as 
well. While the controller may process such data in 
compliance with the data protection principles and 
he may rely on legitimate interests for justifying such 
processing if needed, there are some variations.315 In 
particular, consent to processing special categories 
of data has to be express and, by statute, there is no 
legitimate interest in including special categories of 
data in creditworthiness checks.316
103 The GDPR prohibits the processing of special 
categories of data as defined in Article 9 of the GDPR, 
under the assumption that what is unknown cannot 
be used to discriminate.317 Special categories of data 
are: data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political 
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade 
union membership, genetic data, biometric data, 
data concerning health or data concerning a natural 
person’s sex life or sexual orientation.318 However, 
the law provides exemptions for neutral or desirable 
processing of these special categories of data, and 
allows the processing of such data with the data 
313 Gabor P. Blechta, ‘Art. 3 DSG‘ in: Urs Maurer-Lambrou and 
Gabor P. Blechta (eds) Basler Kommentar Datenschutzgesetz, 
Öffentlichkeitsgesetz (3rd edn, Helbing Lichtenhahn 2014) 
para 27.
314 Art. 3 lit. c DPA.
315 Rosenthal (n 305) para 15.
316 Art. 4 para 5 DPA and Art. 13 para 2 lit. c DPA.
317 Benedikt Buchner, ‘Art. 1 DS-GVO‘ in: Jürgen Kühling and 
Benedikt Buchner (eds) Datenschutz-Grundverordnung/BDSG 
(2nd edn, C.H. Beck 2018), para 14. 
318 Art. 9 para 1 GDPR.
subject’s explicit consent. While EU member states 
may enact further derogations,319 neither legitimate 
interests nor necessity for the performance of a 
contract are a legitimate ground for the processing 
of special categories of data.320
104 These requirements and restrictions do not 
specifically relate to the individualisation of 
insurance contracts. But obviously they also have 
to be considered and met by insurance companies 
processing data that falls within one (or several) of 
these special categories.
III. U.S./California
1. Sector-Specific Data Protection 
Laws on a Federal Level
105 The situation with data privacy law in the U.S. is 
comparable to the situation regarding insurance 
law: the U.S. does not have a comprehensive data 
protection or data privacy law or any law regulating 
all issues of information privacy or security.321 Also 
there is no direct expressed right of privacy in the 
U.S. Constitution or the Bill of Rights. But according 
to the U.S. Supreme Court, privacy is implicitly 
protected by the Constitution.322 Moreover, the U.S. 
has many sector-specific federal laws regulating 
financial or health data or children’s privacy.323 
Governmental agencies and industry groups also 
develop (self-regulatory) guidelines - so-called 
“best practices” - but in general these are not legally 
binding.324 Notably, Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) Act declares unfair and deceptive 
acts or practices unlawful, with deception being the 
primary vehicle for privacy enforcement.325 However, 
the FTC also enforces other privacy regulations.326
319 Art. 9 para 2 lit. g GDPR.
320 Cf. Art. 9 para 2 GDPR and Art. 22 para 2 GDPR.
321 Denis T. Rice, ‘Challenges of Privacy Compliance and 
Litigation’ in: Elizabeth M. Johnson and Jean Magistrale (eds) 
Privacy Compliance and Litigation in California (September 2017 
update, Cal CEB) para 1.2.
322 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965); Clara Ruyan Martin 
and David B. Oshinsky, ‘Privacy Law and Privacy Policy’ in: 
Suzanne L. Weakley (ed) Internet Law and Practice in California 
(July 2017 update, Cal. CEB) para 9.7. See Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 US 558 [2003]; Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113 [1973].
323 Kurt Wimmer, ‘United States’ in: Monika Kuschewsky 
(ed) Data Protection & Privacy: International Series (3rd edn, 
Thomson Reuters 2016), 1093, 1093.
324 Peter Swire and DeBrae Kennedy-Mayo, ‘U.S. Private-Sector 
Privacy’ (2nd edn, IAPP 2018) 58.
325 15 U.S.C. § 41.
326 See Swire and Kennedy-Mayo (n 324) 42ff.
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106 In contrast to the EU, the U.S. does not have a 
default prohibition of data processing. Accordingly, 
the processing of personal data is allowed unless a 
sector-specific restriction or prohibition applies.327 
In addition to the sector-specific federal regulations, 
the individual states have laws of their own, many of 
them mapping respective federal laws. As a result, 
U.S. data privacy law is a complex patchwork of 
federal and state regulations, which covers different 
jurisdictions and different sectors.328
107 On the federal level, the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),329 the 
Gramm Leach Bliley Act (GLBA),330 the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FCRA)331 and the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA),332 are relevant for 
insurers.333
a.) Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA)
108 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA), which was supplemented by the 
Health Information Technology for Economic and 
Clinical Health Act (HITECH Act) in 2009,334 provides 
for national standards to protect the privacy and 
security of healthcare information. The HIPAA 
regulations regarding information privacy are set 
forth in the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rule.335 HIPAA 
regulates the use and disclosure of “protected health 
information” by covered entities.336 Protected health 
information is defined as “individually identifiable 
health information”.337 The information has to 
be created or received by a health care provider, 
relate to health or the provision of health care, 
327 Lothar Determann, California Privacy Law (3rd edn, IAPP 2018) 
38. 
328 Wimmer (n 323), 1093; Rice (n 321) para 1.2.
329 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 
26 U.S.C., § 9801.
330 The Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA), also known as the 
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 6801. 
331 The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
332 The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000ff., 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff.
333 The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-
58.) would prohibit unfair or deceptive practices and is 
applied to consumer’s offline and online privacy and data 
security policies. But, due to the McCarran Ferguson Act, the 
business of insurance is only within the FTCA’s jurisdiction 
as far as it is not regulated by state law (15 U.S.C. § 1012).
334 Wimmer (n 323) 1100. 
335 45 C.F.R. Part 160 and 164. Cf. Swire and Kennedy-Mayo 
(n 324) 167ff; Wimmer (n 323), 1100.
336 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a). John T. Soma and others, Privacy Law in 
a nutshell (2nd edn, West Academic Publishing 2014) 114.
337 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
and there has to be reasonable grounds to believe 
that a person can be identified through the data.338 
HIPAA’s Privacy Rule does not apply to de-identified 
data, meaning such information may be shared 
freely. Nevertheless HIPAA provides protection to a 
lesser degree with respect to data that is largely de-
identified but may contain data which could enable 
re-identification (limited data set).339 By regulation, 
limited data sets can only be shared for research, 
public health, and health care operations, but no 
other purposes.340 Covered entities are health plans, 
health care clearinghouses and some health care 
providers.341 The notion of “health plan” refers to 
an individual or group plan that provides or pays 
the cost of medical care. Health plan includes group 
health insurance and health insurance issuers, which 
are defined as a licensed and state-level regulated 
insurance company, as well as insurance service 
providers, and insurance organisations.342 Most 
insurance companies are covered by this notion343 
and accordingly, health insurance policies are 
subject to HIPAA.
109 Covered entities have to comply with certain 
administrative, physical, technical and organisational 
security standards. For example they must ensure 
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
electronic protected health information.344 A covered 
entity may not use or disclose protected health 
information, unless permitted or required by the 
privacy rule or with written authorisation by the 
individual who is the subject of the information.345 
Protected health information may be used with 
the consent of the individual or for treatment, for 
payment, and for health care operations.346 Generally, 
underwriting, enrolment, premium rating, and 
other activities in connection with health insurance 
contract formation or renewal, as well as with health 
338 Wimmer (n 323) 1094.
339 Determann (n 327) 148ff; see: 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b) for the 
requirements for de-identification of protected health 
information and 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e) for the requirements 
regarding limited data sets.
340 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(E)(3).
341 45 C.F.R. § 160.102(a).
342 Cf. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. The notion of “health plan” also 
includes federal and state government health benefit plans, 
such as Medicare and Medicaid (Medi-Cal), but excludes 
workers’ compensation insurers (Paul T. Smith, ‘Health 
Information Privacy’, in: Elizabeth M. Johnson and Jean 
Magistrale (eds) Privacy Compliance and Litigation in California 
(September 2017 update, Cal CEB) para 7.25).
343 Daniel J. Solove and Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy Law 
Fundamentals (2017 edn, IAPP 2017) 99.
344 45 C.F.R. § 164.306 (general security standards); 45 C.F.R. 
§ 164.308 (administrative safeguards), 45 C.F.R. § 164.310 
(physical safeguards); 45 C.F.R. § 164.312 (technical 
safeguards); 45 C.F.R. § 164.314 (organizational safequards); 
Determann (n 327) 150.
345 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a).
346 45 C.F.R § 164.502.
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benefits, qualify as such health care operations.347 
While use, disclosure and requests of protected 
health information shall be limited to the minimum 
necessary to accomplish the intended purposes of 
said operation, the use and disclosure of genetic 
information for underwriting purposes is entirely 
prohibited.348 Finally, under HIPAA an individual has 
a right to be adequately notified (notice of privacy 
practice) of the possible uses and disclosures of its 
protected health information, as well as of its rights 
and the covered entity’s legal duties with respect 
to protected health information.349 In this notice of 
privacy practice, a health plan that uses protected 
health information for underwriting must include 
a statement that it is prohibited from using or 
disclosing genetic information for this purpose.350
b.) Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)
110 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) limits the 
disclosure of non-public personal information 
collected by a financial institution,351 i.e. an 
institution engaging in activities which are financial 
in nature.352 By statute, insuring against loss, harm, 
damage, illness, disability, or death is qualified as 
financial activity.353 Therefore, insurance companies 
are subject to the GLBA. With regard to its material 
scope of application, the GLBA protects personally 
identifiable financial information that is provided by, 
results from, or is otherwise obtained in connection 
with consumers and customers who obtain financial 
products.354 However, the Act is neither applicable to 
information in the public domain, nor to non-public 
financial information. With regard to substantive 
provisions, the GLBA imposes privacy and data 
security obligations on financial institutions. The 
Financial Privacy Rule foresees that privacy notices 
need to be provided to customers who obtain a 
financial product or service. Furthermore, certain 
restrictions on a financial institution’s information 
sharing practices, as well as a duty to safeguard 
customer information (Safeguard Rule), are 
imposed.355 The customer must be informed about the 
institution’s privacy policies and practices ab initio 
347 45 C.F.R. § 164.501.
348 45 C.F.R § 164.502(a)(5) and 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(1).
349 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(a)(1).
350 45 CFR §§ 164.502(a) in connection with 164.520(b).
351 John T. Soma and others (n 336) 94.
352 15 U.S.C. § 6809(3)(A) and 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k).
353 Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 6809(3); 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(B). ‘Financial 
Data Privacy’ in: Elizabeth M. Johnson and Jean Magistrale 
(eds) Privacy Compliance and Litigation in California (September 
2017 update, Cal CEB) para 6.4.
354 15 U.S.C. § 6809(4), 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(o); Wimmer (n 323) 1094.
355 Wimmer (n 323) 1101.
and kept up-to-date at least annually.356 In particular, 
information on the disclosure and protection of non-
public information must be given.357 The customers 
must also be informed about the possibility that their 
non-public personal information may be disclosed to 
a non-affiliated358 third party and they must be given 
the opportunity to opt-out of having their non-public 
personal information shared with non-affiliated 
third parties, except for fraud prevention or the 
processing of consumer transactions.359 Additionally, 
the financial institutions have to ensure the security 
of the customer‘s information and records. The 
latter must be protected against anticipated security 
threats or hazards and unauthorised access or use.360
111 Besides the relatively detailed rules on privacy 
policies and information sharing, the GLBA does 
not restrict the use of personal information and 
hence does not limit the possibilities of personalising 
insurance contracts based on big data.
c.) Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)
112 The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)361 shall 
protect consumers from inaccurate or unfair 
uses of their personal information in credit 
reports.362 The Act regulates the disclosure and 
use of personal information supplied by Consumer 
Reporting Agencies (CRA),363 and in particular the 
use of consumer reports364 for adverse action.365 
Insurance companies might have an interest in 
consumer reports when individualising insurance 
contracts with regard to the willingness to pay. 
By statute, denial, cancellation, or other adverse 
356 15 U.S.C. § 6803.
357 15 U.S.C. 6803(a)(1)&(2) and 15 U.S.C. 6803(a)(3).
358 “The term “affiliate” means any company that controls, is 
controlled by, or is under common control with another company.” 
(15 U.S.C. §  6809(6)).
359 15 U.S.C. §  6802; Determann (n 327) 94.
360 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b). Johnson and Magistrale (n 353) 
para 6.13.
361 Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x.
362 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
363 Johnson and Magistrale (n 353) para 6.15; Pauline T. Kim 
and Erika Hanson, ‘People Analytics and the Regulation of 
Information under the Fair Credit Reporting Act’ (2016) 61 
St. Louis U.L.J. 17, 21.
364 A consumer report is defined as “any written, oral, or other 
communication of any information by a consumer reporting 
agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit 
standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, 
personal characteristics, or mode of living”, which is 
used for determining the eligibility for credit, insurance, 
employment or other authorized purposes (15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681a(d)).
365 Swire and Kennedy-Mayo (n 324) 188ff; Johnson and 
Magistrale (n 353) para 6.38. 
Big Data in the Insurance Industry
2019237 2
or unfavourable change of coverage, as well as 
unfavourable changes of the charged amount of any 
insurance, are considered such adverse actions.366 
Thus the use of consumer reports by insurers would 
have to comply with the FCRA.367
113 A CRA may only furnish a consumer report in 
accordance with the instructions of the consumer, 
or when it has reason to believe that the requesting 
person has a permissible purpose to obtain a 
consumer report.368 By statute, the underwriting of 
insurance is such a permissible purpose.369 
114 Where an adverse action is taken based on 
information contained in a consumer report, the 
user of the report shall inform the consumer about 
this fact.370 Whenever consumer reports are used 
for big data analytics and such analysis leads to an 
insurer taking an adverse action, the insurer has to 
inform the consumer. However, the FCRA does not 
apply to companies when they use data derived from 
their customer-relationship in their decision-making 
processes.371 As long as all the data in the insurer’s 
database is derived directly from the consumer and 
not from a consumer reporting agency, the FCRA 
would not prevent performing big data analytics.
d.) Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA)
115 The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
(GINA) prohibits employers and health insurance 
companies from discriminating against individuals 
on the basis of genetic information.372 Therefore 
companies should refrain from collecting genetic 
information unless it is absolutely necessary and 
permitted by law.373 Health insurers, in particular, 
are not allowed to request or purchase genetic 
information for underwriting purposes or prior to an 
individual’s enrolment under a plan or coverage in 
connection with this enrolment.374 They may also not 
request an individual’s family member to undergo 
366 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(k)(1)(B)(i).
367 Cf. Determann (n 327) 101.
368 15 U.S.C. §  1681b; see: Determann (n 327) 103.
369 15 U.S.C. §  1681b(a)(3)(C).
370 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a)(1)).
371 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(2)(A)(i).
372 See above, D.III.1.d). GINA expressly made genetic 
information protected health information under HIPAA, 
thus GINA violations are treated and enforced as an 
unauthorised use or disclosure under HIPAA (cf. John T. 
Soma and others (n 336) 133.)
373 Determann (n 327) 145.
374 29 U.S.C. § 1182(c)(4)(C); 29 U.S.C. § 1182(d); Determann 
(n 327) 146.
genetic testing.375 Furthermore, premiums may not 
be adjusted on the basis of genetic information.376
2. Californian Data Protection Law
116 As on the federal level, the state of California does 
(not yet)377 have a comprehensive data protection 
or (informational) privacy law. So far, California 
has only enacted harms-based privacy legislation, 
meaning that merely statutory protection against 
specific threats as well as rules relevant to certain 
industries and groups of data subjects exist.378
a.) Californian Constitution
117 The Californian constitution grants all people certain 
inalienable rights, one of them being a right to 
privacy.379 This right applies to the local government, 
to private entities and to individuals.380 But neither 
the wording, nor its interpretation by courts, impose 
concrete compliance obligations on companies.381 
A cause of action based on a violation of the right 
to privacy is possible if three elements are present: 
a legally protected privacy interest; a reasonable 
expectation of privacy; and a serious invasion of 
the privacy interest.382 Thus, companies should keep 
the constitutional right to privacy in mind, even if 
intrusive invasions of personal privacy are in line 
with specific statutes and common law principles.383
b.) Insurance Information and 
Privacy Protection Act (IIPPA)
118 The personal information of insurance applicants or 
policyholders is strictly regulated in California, in 
particular by the Insurance Information and Privacy 
375 29 U.S.C. § 1182(c).
376 29 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(3)(A).
377 See below, E.III.2.f).
378 Determann (n 327) 37. An overview of some of California’s 
major privacy laws can be found here: State of California 
Department of Justice, ‘Privacy laws’ <https://oag.ca.gov/
privacy/privacy-laws> accessed 12 June 2019.
379 1972 Cal. Const. Art. I, § 1.
380 Determann (n 327) 44; Roy G. Weatherup, ‘Common Law and 
Constitutional Privacy Protection’ in: Elizabeth M. Johnson 
and Jean Magistrale (eds) Privacy Compliance and Litigation in 
California (September 2017 update, Cal CEB) para 2.6; Hill v. 
National Collegiate Athletic Assn. 7 Cal.4th 1 (1994), 18-20.
381 Determann (n 327) 45.
382 Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. 7 Cal.4th 1 (1994), 35-3. 
Witkin (n 224) para 643(c); Determann (n 327) 46.
383 Determann (n 327) 45.
2019
Florent Thouvenin, Fabienne Suter, Damian George and Rolf H. Weber
238 2
Protection Act (IIPPA).384 The IIPPA’s purpose is 
to establish standards for the collection, use, and 
disclosure of information gathered in connection 
with the insurance business, and to maintain a 
balance between the insurers’ need for information 
and the public’s need for fairness in insurance 
information practices.385 The regulations apply to 
health and property-casualty insurance386
119 Among others, the act contains provisions 
regarding the notice of information practices to 
all applicants and policyholders in connection 
with insurance transactions,387 the disclosure of 
personal or privileged information,388 the right to 
access recorded personal information,389 and the 
right to have recorded information corrected or a 
portion of it deleted.390 Notably, the IIPPA restricts 
on what basis an adverse decision may rest.391 By 
statute, declination and termination of insurance 
coverage as well as charging higher rates for 
property or casual insurance or offering higher 
than standard rates in health insurance qualify 
as adverse actions.392 Information on preceding 
adverse underwriting decisions, the information 
that an individual previously obtained insurance 
coverage through a residual market mechanism, 
and information possibly stemming from insurance-
support organisations shall not be used as a basis 
for an adverse action.393 Thus the information an 
insurance company can base an adverse underwriting 
decision on is limited. Furthermore, IIPPA also vests 
the insured with a right to receive reasons for an 
adverse underwriting decision.394
c.) California Confidentiality of 
Medical Information Act (CMIA)
120 The California Confidentiality of Medical 
Information Act (CMIA)395 protects the privacy of 
California residents’ medical information.396 Any 
individually identifiable information regarding 
a patient’s medical history, mental or physical 
condition, or treatment in possession of or derived 
384 INS §§ 791-791.29.
385 INS § 791.
386 INS § 791.01.
387 INS § 791.04.
388 INS §§ 791.06, 791.13.
389 INS § 791.08.
390 INS § 791.09.
391 INS § 791.12; Witkin (n 32) para 541.
392 INS § 791.02(a)(1)(A), (B), (D) and (E).
393 INS § 791.12.
394 INS § 791.10.
395 CIV §§ 56-56.37.
396 Cf. Determann (n 327) 156.
from a provider of health care, health care service 
plan, pharmaceutical company, or contractor, is 
protected.397 The CMIA applies to providers of health 
care and their contractors and to health service 
plans.398 Health insurers must comply with the Act.399 
In 2014 the CMIA was amended to cover providers 
of software and hardware that allow customers 
to manage their health,400 making it applicable to 
wearables.
121 The use or disclosure of health information “for 
any purpose not necessary to provide health care 
services to the patient,” is prohibited unless the 
individual has given his consent, or it is otherwise 
permitted by the CMIA. For example, the disclosure 
to an insurer for the payment of services is permitted 
by statute.401 If an insurance company receives 
medical information from a person or company that 
is subject to the CMIA, it may not further disclose 
this information except in accordance with a new 
authorisation that meets the requirements of the 
CMIA.402 However, the CMIA does not prevent the 
disclosure of medical information by a provider of 
health care to an insurance institution subject to the 
IIPPA, provided the institution has complied with 
all requirements for obtaining the information set 
forth by IIPPA.403
d.) California Financial Information 
Privacy Act (CFIPA)
122 The California Financial Information Privacy Act404 
(CFIPA) makes use of the GLBA’s reservation for 
states wishing to expand and tighten its rules on 
financial privacy protection.405 The CFIPA requires 
financial institutions406 to obtain written consent 
from a customer before disclosing said customer’s 
non-public personal financial information.407 In 
some cases, CFIPA mandates that this consent 
must be provided by an affirmative action (opt-in), 
397 CIV § 56.05(j).
398 Determann (n 327) 156; see: CIV §§ 56.05(m) in connection 
with 56.06. Cf. Fn. 69.
399 Determann (n 327) 157.
400 CIV §§ 56.06; Determann (n 327) 157.
401 CIV §§ 56.10; cf. Paul T. Smith (n 342) para 7.4.
402 CIV § 56.13; cf. Determann (n 327) 158.
403 CIV § 56.10(c)(11).
404 California Financial Code (FIN) §§ 4050 – 4060.
405 FIN §§ 4051.5(a); Swire and Kennedy-Mayo (n 324) 204; 
Johnson and Magistrale (n 353) para 6.47.
406 Financial institution is defined as it is in the GLBA, 15 
U.S.C. § 6809(3)(A) as well as FIN § 4052(c) refer to 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1843(k).
407 Non-public personal financial information is defined the 
same way as under the GLBA, compare: 15 U.S.C. §  6809(4) 
and FIN § 4052(a).
Big Data in the Insurance Industry
2019239 2
whereas, in general, opt-out consent would be 
sufficient pursuant to the GLBA.408 The written 
consent (opt-in) of the consumers must be obtained, 
if financial information shall be disclosed to third 
parties that are neither affiliates nor financial 
institutions for the purpose of offering non-financial 
products and services.409 However, when disclosing 
non-public personal information to an affiliate, a 
health insurer must only provide the insured with 
an opt-out option and remind them annually in 
writing that the information is being disclosed.410 
An opt-out notice must also be sent if a financial 
institution wants to share financial information with 
another (non-affiliated) financial institution for the 
purpose of offering financial products or services.411 
However, under the CFIPA financial institutions are 
not required to obtain a consumer’s consent for 
sharing non-medical, non-public information with 
their fully owned subsidiaries, as long as they are 
engaged in the same line of business and regulated 
by the same functional regulator.412
123 Insurers would be interested in non-public financial 
information for individualising insurance contracts 
in accordance with the willingness to pay. In such 
a scenario the CFIPA’s requirements regarding the 
disclosure of non-public personal information need 
to be observed. Opt-out and opt-in requirements do 
limit the information on which the individualisation 
of insurance contracts may be based with regard to 
individuals that object to their information being 
shared. But as far as the individualisation is based 
on non-public financial information already in 
possession of an insurer or its subsidiaries, the CFIPA 
does not limit the leeway for individualisation.
e.) Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies 
Act (CCRAA) and Investigative Consumer 
Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA)
124 The Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act 
(CCRAA)413 and the Investigative Consumer Reporting 
Agencies Act (ICRAA)414 govern how consumer credit 
reporting agencies furnish information and reports 
for the needs of commerce. They require that such 
agencies need to adopt reasonable procedures and 
408 Johnson and Magistrale (n 353) para 6.47.
409 FIN § 4053; Determann (n 327) 97.
410 FIN § 4053(b); Johnson and Magistrale (n 353) para 6.48.
411 Determann (n 327) 99. This financial product must be offered 
by at least one of the institutions, the receiving institution 
must be clearly identified and maintain the information 
confidentiality (cf. Johnson and Magistrale (n 346) 
para 6.48).
412 FIN § 4053(c); Determann (n 327) 98ff.
413 CIV §§ 1785.1-1785.36.
414 CIV §§ 1786 - 1786.60. 
contain provisions concerning the confidentiality, 
accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilisation of 
such information.415 While the CCRAA regulates 
consumer credit reports416 and thus concerns a 
person’s creditworthiness,417 the FCRA also applies 
to reports regarding a consumer’s character, i.e., 
general reputation, personal characteristics, or 
mode of living.418 To a large extent both Acts, the 
CCRAA and the ICRAA, duplicate federal law, while 
in addition many provisions may be pre-empted by 
the FCRA.419 Thus the relationship between CCRAA 
and FCRA is very complex.
125 A consumer credit report under the CCRAA is 
any written, oral, or other communication of any 
information by a consumer credit reporting agency 
bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit 
standing, or credit capacity, which is among others, 
used for insurance underwriting.420 Overall the CCRAA 
defines terms similarly to the FCRA and contains 
similar obligations for reports regarding someone’s 
creditworthiness.421 As is the case under the FCRA, 
whenever a CRA has reason to believe that a person 
intends to use a consumer report in connection with 
the underwriting of insurance, it may furnish said 
report to that person.422 If information in a consumer 
credit report leads to adverse action with respect to 
any consumer, he or she also has to be provided with 
an adverse action notice.423
126 Investigative consumer reports as regulated in the 
ICRAA are reports in which information is obtained 
on a consumer’s character, general reputation, 
personal characteristics, or mode of living.424 
This definition is broader than the definition 
of investigative consumer reports contained in 
the FCRA, since it includes information obtained 
“through any means”425, while under the FCRA, the 
information is obtained through personal interviews 
only.426
127 The ICRAA’s rules are stricter than the CCRAA 
rules pertaining to consumer credit reports.427 
An investigative consumer report may only be 
415 CIV § 1785.1(d) and CIV § 1786 (f).
416 CIV § 1785.3(c).
417 Johnson and Magistrale (n 353) para 6.50.
418 CIV § 1786.2(c).
419 Johnson and Magistrale (n 353) para 6.50.
420 CIV § 1785.3(c) in connection with CIV § 1785.11(a)(3)(C).
421 15 U.S.C. § 1681 a(e); Johnson and Magistrale (n 353) 
para 6.52.
422 CIV § 1785.11(a)(3)(C).
423 CIV § 1785.20.
424 CIV § 1786.2(c).
425 CIV § 1786.2(c).
426 Johnson and Magistrale (n 353) para 6.54.
427 Johnson and Magistrale (n 353) para 6.54.
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prepared when a need for a specific purpose can 
be demonstrated, e.g. for determining eligibility 
or rates for insurance.428 In general, the consumer 
needs to be informed a priori when an investigative 
consumer report is requested by the user.429 Also a 
consumer has to give his consent if an investigative 
report that contains medical information shall be 
sent to an insurer.430 If an insurance for personal, 
family, or household purposes increases the charge 
for insurance, or denies the consumer insurance 
based on a consumer’s investigative consumer 
report, the insurance must inform the consumer and 
supply the name and address of the investigative 
consumer reporting agency that made the report.431
f.) Outlook: California Consumer 
Privacy Act (CCPA)
128 In 2018 a Californian ballot initiative for a 
comprehensive consumer privacy act enforced 
through litigation had received sufficient signatures 
to cast a vote. Since laws enacted through ballot 
initiatives are almost impossible to revise, the 
legislature was under pressure to present an 
indirect counter-proposal, which would make the 
initiators withdraw the ballot initiative. It was not 
until the last day of possible withdrawal that the 
Californian legislative hastily enacted the California 
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA).432 The CCPA will enter 
into force 1 January 2020 and will be supplemented 
by regulations issued by the Californian Attorney 
General on or before 1 July 2020.433 This guidance will 
likely determine the scope of how the law is to be 
enforced in practice, since it is expected to elaborate 
on key definitions such as “personal information” 
and “unique identifiers”, as well as procedures 
companies must have in place to effectuate the 
CCPA’s consumer rights.
129 The CCPA protects “consumers”, which are defined 
as California residents and the act thus applies to 
personal information relating to any California 
resident.434 Companies that do business in California 
428 CIV § 1786.16(d) in connection with CIV § 1786.12(d)(2).
429 Johnson and Magistrale (n 353) para 6.54; CIV § 1786.16.
430 CIV § 1786.12(f).
431 CIV § 1786.40; Johnson and Magistrale (n 353) para 6.54.
432 CIV §§ 1798.100 -1798.199. Cf. Ian C. Ballon, ‘Chapter 26 Data 
Privacy: 13A: Litigation Risks and Compliance Obligations 
under the California Consumer Privacy Act’, in: Ian C. Ballon 
(ed) E-Commerce and Internet Law: Legal Treatise with Forms (2nd 
edn, 2019 Update, Thomson Reuters/West Publishing) vol 3, 
26-401, Fn. 3; cf. Nicholas Confessore, ‘The Unlikely Activist 
Who Took Silicon Valley – and Won’ NY Times Magazine, (New 
York 14 August 2018) <www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/
magazine/facebook-google-privacy-data.html>.
433 CIV 1798.185(a); Ballon (n 432) 26-402.
434 Lothar Determann, ‘New California Law Against Data 
and either: (i) have an annual gross revenue of 
more than $25 million; (ii) receive or share personal 
information of more than 50,000 consumers, 
households, or devices; or (iii) derive more than 
50 percent of their annual revenues from selling 
consumers’ personal information have to comply 
with de CCPA.435
130 The CCPA regulates the selling of personal 
information and provides consumers with various 
rights. Selling is defined as “selling, renting, 
releasing, disclosing, disseminating, making 
available, transferring, or otherwise communicating 
orally, in writing, or by electronic or other means, 
a consumer’s personal information by the business 
to another business or a third party for monetary 
or other valuable consideration”.436 However, 
businesses can claim that they are covered by one 
of several complexly specified exemptions from the 
definition of “selling”.437
131 Consumers will have a right to be informed, to receive 
a privacy notice, and they will have access rights.438 
The information to be provided includes inter alia the 
categories of personal information collected about 
the consumer, the categories of sources and the 
categories of recipients.439 Unlike the ballot initiative, 
consumers do not have a right to receive the name 
and identity of the data recipients.440 Furthermore, 
consumers are vested with opt-out options, whereas 
minors have to opt-in to the collection of personal 
information.441 The CCPA prescribes certain means of 
communication; for example, it requires businesses 
to communicate the opt-out option with consumers 
via a clear and conspicuous link on the business’s 
Internet homepage, titled “Do Not Sell My Personal 
Information”.442 Furthermore, consumers have a 
right to get their data deleted.443 Also companies 
must not discriminate against California residents 
on the basis of them exercising their rights under 
the CCPA by denying goods or services, charging 
different prices, or providing a different service 
quality. However, differing prices, rates or quality 
may still be applied, if these differences are 
Sharing’ (2018) 19 CRi, 117, 118; CIV § 1798.140(g).
435 CIV 1798.140(c). Christin McMeley and others, ‘California 
Consumer Privacy Act: A Rapid Q&A’ (2018) 23(7) Cyberspace 
Lawyer NL, 3.
436 CIV §§ 1798.140(t)(1).
437 Cf. Determann (n 434) 119; CIV §§ 1798.140(t)(2)A-D.
438 CIV §§ 1798.100, 1798.110, 1798.115.
439 CIV § 1798.110(a)(1), (2) and (3).
440 Thomas Hoeren and Stefan Pinelli, ‘Das neue kalifornische 
Datenschutzrecht am Maßstab der DS-GVO: Auswirkungen 
des CCPA auf global agierende europäische Unternehmen‘ 
(2018) MMR, 711, 712.
441 CIV § 1798.120. Ballon (n 432) 26-406.
442 CIV 1798.135(a)(1).
443 CIV § 1798.105. Ballon (n 432) 26-406.
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reasonably related to the value of the consumer’s 
data.444
132 California Civil Code (CIV) § 1798.175 provides that 
in the event of a conflict, the law that provides 
the greatest privacy protection takes precedence. 
However, the CCPA appears to prevent some of 
these conflicts by clarifying that it neither applies 
to medical information governed by the Medical 
Information Act nor to protected health information 
that is collected by a covered entity or business 
associate governed by the privacy, security, and 
breach notification rules issued pursuant to HIPAA 
and the HITECH Act.445 Further reservations concern 
the FCRA, the GLBA and the CFIPA.446
IV. Findings
133 All data processing operations in Switzerland and 
in the EU have to comply with applicable data 
protection law. Swiss data protection law makes 
the analysis of special (i.e. sensitive) categories of 
data subject to additional safeguards and the GDPR 
prohibits the processing of similar categories of 
data as a matter of principle. However, while both 
jurisdictions recognise a fundamental right to data 
protection, they also recognise that such right is 
by no means absolute. Hence, data processing in 
general, as well as profiling with the use of special 
categories of data in particular, is permitted with the 
data subject’s consent. The main restriction here is 
that this consent has to be given freely and may be 
withdrawn without further ado. The processing of 
personal data for the personalisation of insurance 
contracts could also be deemed legitimate as far as 
it is necessary for the performance of such contracts 
or for pursuing a legitimate interest of the insurance 
company. In addition, insurance companies must 
ensure that their (potential) policyholders are aware 
that their personal data is processed to calculate 
individual offers based on their individual risk 
profile and/or their willingness to pay.
134 The restrictions these requirements impose on the 
individualisation of insurance contracts mainly 
depend on how the notions of “transparency”, 
“freely given consent” and “legitimate interest” 
are understood. While there are convincing reasons 
to acknowledge that the lawfulness of processing 
personal data for offering individual insurance 
contracts can be based on the legitimate interests 
444 CIV § 1798.125(a)(1); Determann (n 434) 120.
445 CIV § 1798.145(c)(1)(1). However, Determann states that the 
CCPA does not address any overlaps or inconsistencies with 
any of California’s existing privacy laws (Determann (n 434) 
117).
446 Ballon (n 432) 26-422.
of insurance companies or should be considered 
compatible with the initial purpose of the insurance 
contract in most cases, it is hard to predict whether 
data protection authorities and courts would actually 
accept this reasoning. As a consequence, insurance 
companies are well advised to always ask for the 
specific consent of their (potential) policyholders 
prior to processing their data for providing an 
individual offer.
135 In California, a patchwork of privacy laws needs 
to be observed when individualising insurance 
contracts. Some federal laws set significant limits 
to individualisation based on certain categories of 
data, such as HIPAA’s prohibition to disclose and 
GINA’s prohibition to request or purchase genetic 
information for underwriting purposes. The majority 
of the rules, however, require transparency and 
security about data processing operations, without 
setting specific boundaries to individualisation. 
On the state level, most notably the IIPPA vests 
consumers not only with a right to have recorded 
information corrected or a portion of it deleted, but 
actually limits the informational basis for adverse 
action taken against the insured. The CFIPA also 
restricts information sharing between insurance 
companies and non-affiliates, but does not limit 
personalisation based on information in possession 
of the insurance or fully owned subsidiaries. While 
the novel CCPA will grant consumers the possibility 
to opt-out from having their information sold, the 
personalisation of insurance contracts appears 
to still be possible, since it is arguably reasonably 
related to the value of the consumer’s data.
136 In sum, the all-encompassing Swiss and European 
approach to data protection law operates with 
very abstract concepts which leaves insurance 
companies with a great margin of interpretation and 
a remarkable amount of legal uncertainty. However, 
using big data analytics for the individualisation 
of insurance contracts is not prohibited by data 
protection law and should be compliant as long 
as the correct safeguards are in place, notably by 
requesting the data subject’s consent. In California, 
data may be used for big data analytics in principle. 
But since rate increases qualify as adverse actions 
by statute under the IIPPA and the CCRAA, these 
regulations limit an insurer’s informational basis. 
Thus, Californian data privacy laws set forth 
some significant and specific boundaries to the 
individualisation of insurance contracts.
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F. Conclusion
137 The aim of this paper is to outline possible solutions 
for dealing with the individualisation of insurance 
contracts, namely with regard to individually 
calculated insurance premiums. It does so by 
analysing the legal situation on both sides of the 
Atlantic, using the jurisdictions of California and 
Switzerland as examples for two quite different 
approaches. The individualisation of insurance 
contracts has become technically possible and 
economically feasible in most insurance sectors 
thanks to novel technologies such as big data 
analytics. In order to provide a broad picture, 
this paper does not focus on one specific type 
of insurance, but includes three different types; 
namely, mandatory health insurance, renters 
insurance and automobile insurance. In addition, 
we analyse individualisation based on the two 
most important criteria in the insurance sector: 
individualisation based on the risk profile of the 
insured and individualisation with regard to his or 
her willingness to pay. Obviously, these two criteria 
can be combined when calculating the individual 
premium of a customer, but it seems that (until now) 
insurance companies have been rather reluctant 
to individualise their contracts according to their 
customers’ willingness to pay.
138 Whether insurance companies should be allowed 
to individualise their contracts and premiums or 
whether the principle of solidarity should prevail, 
is being debated in various disciplines. While ethical 
considerations may speak in favour of solidarity at 
least for some types of insurance,447 an economic 
analysis would reach the conclusion that the 
individualisation of insurance contracts is beneficial 
for most individuals and the society at large. Given 
these different perspectives and the importance of 
the respective arguments, there is certainly no simple 
answer on how to deal with the individualisation of 
insurance contracts. Accordingly, it may come as no 
surprise that the two jurisdictions we have chosen 
to analyse – Switzerland and California– do not only 
rely on very different approaches to deal with the 
phenomenon, but they also come to quite different 
conclusions. Perhaps surprisingly, the leeway for 
individualisation is much smaller in California than 
in Switzerland for renters and automobile insurance, 
while the results are very similar for mandatory 
health insurance.
139 In Switzerland, the insurance sector is regulated as 
well, but less densely than in California and there 
are also important variations between different 
types of insurance. While there is strictly no leeway 
447 Michele Loi and Markus Christen, ‘Choosing how to 
discriminate: fair algorithms and risk prediction with big 
data in the insurance sector’, unpublished manuscript. 
for individualising mandatory health insurance 
contracts in Switzerland, an insurer is free to do 
so with regard to supplementary health insurance 
policies. As opposed to health insurance, renters and 
automobile insurance are generally governed by the 
principle of freedom of contract, thereby allowing 
almost unlimited choices to insurance companies. 
Although Switzerland prohibits discrimination on a 
constitutional level and also through the Civil Code 
as well as other regulations, anti-discrimination 
law does not restrict the ability to individualise 
insurance contracts as long as factoring in a 
protected characteristic such as age, gender and the 
like is based on a sound actuarial risk-assessment 
is based on a sound actuarial risk-assessment. The 
most important restrictions for the individualisation 
of insurance contracts stem from data protection 
law, from the Swiss Data Protection Act (DPA) 
as well as from the EU’s General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR). These bodies of law contain 
important barriers for analysing personal data 
about the potential customers and the population at 
large. As a result, the individualisation of insurance 
contracts is only clearly allowed if the customer’s 
specific consent is obtained, while justifying the 
individualisation with legitimate interests comes 
with considerable legal uncertainties.
140 In the U.S. and California, the insurance sector 
is densely regulated. Individualisation based 
on the willingness to pay is straight-forwardly 
excluded in California by way of a notice enacted 
by the Insurance Commissioner. The leeway to 
individualise offers based on the risk assessment 
of individual customers is very limited in all three 
insurance sectors considered. This is especially true 
for the comprehensively regulated health insurance 
market. While there is a little more leeway for 
the individualisation of automobile and renters 
insurance, the scope is still very limited as the rates 
for these types of insurance are subject to prior 
approval by the California Insurance Commissioner 
and the maximum and minimum permitted premium 
is determined by law. As a consequence, insurance 
law limits the ability of insurance companies 
to individualise their insurance contracts to a 
minimum. In addition, U.S. and California law contain 
strict rules with regard to anti-discrimination, which 
further restrict the remaining leeway if protected 
characteristics such as age, gender, race, or place of 
residence are factored into the calculation individual 
premiums. As a consequence, the leeway for the 
individualisation of insurance contracts in California 
is so small that it is doubtful whether running big 
data analytics to individualise insurance premiums 
is commercially feasible. As opposed to Switzerland 
and Europe, however, data privacy laws establish 
no relevant restrictions for the individualisation of 
insurance contracts in the U.S. and California.
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141 Given the restrictions on both sides of the Atlantic 
and the potential benefits of the individualisation 
of insurance contracts, both on an individual and 
a societal level, the result of the analysis is hardly 
satisfying, especially with regard to Switzerland (and 
Europe). Instead of directly or indirectly hindering 
the individualisation of insurance contracts through 
data protection law, Swiss (and European) lawmakers 
should initiate a dialogue involving all stakeholders 
to determine which sectors of insurance should be 
dominated by the principle of solidarity and in which 
sectors the individualisation of insurance contracts 
should be allowed. It is to be expected that there will 
be no uniform answer for all types of insurances. 
Rather, there may be sectors in which solidarity 
should prevail to ensure that no one is excluded from 
insurance coverage; the most important case in point 
being mandatory health insurance. By contrast, 
automobile insurance might be a sector in which 
the individualisation of insurance contracts should 
be allowed to ensure the benefits of the incentives 
provided by individual premiums that are calculated 
based on individual risk profiles of very prudent or 
more hazardous drivers.
142 While this approach should be able to provide 
nuanced and convincing results, it is obvious that 
such a process will need time. For the time being, 
a meaningful step forward would be to allow for 
factoring in the public interest when assessing the 
lawfulness of processing of personal data based on 
the legitimate interest of the controller. This would 
allow insurance companies to at least use readily 
available data for calculating and offering individual 
insurance premiums. The consent of their customers 
would then only be needed if insurance companies 
wanted to collect additional data, e.g. on driving 
behaviour or the physical activity of their customers, 
by using driving or fitness trackers, or other means 
to collect additional data.
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